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One of the most important characteristics of recent years has been the increasing-
ly closer contact among financial intermediaries on the financial markets. This has
involved partly the strengthening of cross-border connections, partly the fading
away of borders among financial sectors, as well as the emergence of financial
conglomerates incorporating different types of financial service providers. The
development of information technology and the process of deregulation taking
place on the financial markets push actors clearly in this direction. From the view-
point of satisfying customer needs, the expansion of international companies is the
most important factor in motivating financial institutions to enter the international
market. Large, international financial service providers rarely remain within the
framework of one sector. By establishing financial conglomerates they aim to sat-
isfy all the financial needs of both corporate and retail customers at one and the
same point . 
The growth of financial conglomerates has been very spectacular in the past ten
years. In parallel with fusions, mostly within the country and characteristically with-
in the sector, independent and well functioning institutions become under the con-
trol of large international financial service providers in order to exploit potential
synergic advantages. This has been beneficial not only from the viewpoint of
increasing financial strength but by coordinating activities of different sectors finan-
cial innovation has accelerated, too.
Institutions safeguarding the stability of the financial system have to monitor the
complex products and processes thus created and – in parallel with the innovations
or only a little bit behind them - find appropriate regulatory responses to the aris-
ing challenges. From among financial market tendencies the convergence of mar-
ket players, thus the higher risk of “contagion”, the complexity of conglomerates
and the scale of their activity, and the efforts to make use of regulatory arbitrage
represent the most important problems which regulators have to solve.
All this has to be undertaken in an environment where borders among nations and
in relation to the activities of financial institutions are disappearing. Consequently,
one of the most important challenges is to create the basis of cooperation of super-
visory institutions, which are still organized on a national basis, and to ensure com-
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supervisory structure, which is traditionally based on the type of activity, might be
a problem. The need to enhance efficiency in the protection of investors’ interest
over and above sectors can be emphasized due to the diversity of realization and
motivation of either intra-group transactions or market transactions among inde-
pendent actors.
This study aims to review forms of cooperation already existing and to demonstrate
regulatory reactions on the level of codification prevailing in some economic
regions. The paper pays special attention to the activity of the inter-sectoral coor-
dinating forum set up under the aegis of BIS with the purpose of regulating con-
glomerates, the European Council’s draft directive based mostly on the Basle rec-
ommendations, and tries to evaluate the preparedness of regulators in Hungary.
In the first part of the study the phenomenon of financial convergence will be thor-
oughly investigated. We overview the most important forms of realization, giving a
detailed description of their methodology and regulatory problems caused by
them. 
Then follows a detailed analysis of financial conglomerates. First, the factors
behind their emergence and the source of problems will be examined. After theo-
retical explanations two cases will be presented, where supervisory institutions
were unable to overcome the problem of complexity of the given institutions, which
regrettably caused the disappearance of depositors’ money and led to several
unlawful acts.
The next part – as a lesson of the case studies – overviews the resulting regulato-
ry resolutions. First we briefly overview the 2001 year-end findings in relation to
the differences in the regulatory environment set up by the independent regulators
of the three sectors. Then we summarize principles and proposals generated by the
inter-sectoral conciliation forum to regulate financial conglomerates, serving as
guidelines for the majority of national regulatory institutions. 
Subsequently, the paper overviews the actual, constitutional regulatory framework
already accepted. It outlines legal regulatory responses of the United States and
Australia concerning the challenges of the regulation of conglomerates. The most
detailed descriptions are the parts on the European Council directives relating to
consolidated supervision, the post-BCCI Directive and the directive drafted on
8
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setting up of the regulatory structure, and regarding most important segments
details of the regulation are outlined, too. The structure of the chapter helps to fol-
low the chronological development of regulation on the basis of market incentives
and regulatory considerations, which give an explanation for the evaluation of the
present and planned regulation.
In the last part of the paper the regulation of financial groups in Hungary is detailed.
Consolidated supervision of financial groups existing in Hungary is at the present
covered only by the Act on Credit Institutions and in the regulations of the Trading
book. However, the requirements specified in these regulations are not in accor-
dance either with EU regulations in force as of the nineties, or with the special risks
of financial groups. Nevertheless, legal harmonization is mandatory for Hungary in
this field, thus the modification of present rules will be inevitable in the near future.
9
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Banking, insurance and security trading,
1 the three, relatively segregated financial
fields, abandoning their former institutional separation and in accordance with pos-
itive regulatory changes, have become more and more close to each other in
increasingly varied forms. Furthermore, this is not only an institutional develop-
ment, regarding only ownership relations; products and services offered by other
sectors have started to turn up in the activities of individual institutions, too. First
of all banks had to face the competition of savings constructions offered by the two
other sectors, very similar to their deposit products. However, the investment serv-
ices of universal banks indicate that competitors expand the borders of their activ-
ity, too. This trend is summarized in the literature as financial convergence.
The higher the organizational integration of the activity of different sectors, the
stronger is the convergence in the territory given, since the possibility to coordi-
nate activities continuously is here the highest. In this sense convergence is max-
imal if the organizations created realize all three financial activities under common
control. From among institutions representing varied sectors, so-called financial
conglomerates that operate their member companies representing particular sec-
tors in a holding form have outstanding importance due to their worldwide pres-
ence. On the lower level of convergence organizationally independent institutions,
being aware of their mutual interests, cooperate in some form or other, which might
involve a joint appearance vis-à-vis clients, but can be business contact, too.
From the point of view of regulation, cooperation among sectors requires increas-
ing attention from the perspective of the real area of risks and responsibility, and
connected with that the continuous presence of solvency. Hereunder the study
introduces those forms of convergence, which do not yet mean, or only partially




1 There are several rankings that categorize financial activities. The present study uses the above rank-
ing – segregating banking, insurance and investment services activities by sectors. The main reason
for this is that these are the sectors which are mentioned by name in the definition of financial con-
glomerates in the focus of the study.2.1. Risk transfer mechanisms  
From among the forms of financial institutions’ convergence the reallocation of
risks is the connecting point, which - although hardly to be followed up in an orga-
nizational sense - gives new elements to the former risk exposure of institutions. 
Efficient management and risk management of comparable portfolio elements
involves more or less the same task for financial institutions acting in different sec-
tors. The major difference is in the place and the way of undertaking risks.
Financial service providers – on assuming credit, insurance, market or operational
risks – have to make decisions about the future management of risks. Concerning
the structure of their balance sheet, capital supply and strategy, they may decide
to  keep,  hedge with opposite positions, or transfer risks to another institution
against some fee. 
Differences in the regulation of various sectors have an important role in decision-
making, especially those which relate to the extent of capital coverage of risks. If
there is a well functioning and effective risk-measuring system in place, institutions
are able to distinguish properly between the regulatory capital requirement of the
given type of risk and the economic capital, which is needed to cover the real risk.
If there is a considerable difference in favour of the former, the institution might feel
encouraged to apply active risk management techniques. This might involve,
among other things, the sharing of risks with other institutions. Assessing the real
extent of risks, or calculating the attainable yield on risky assets is inevitable on
the side of the recipient, too. The parallel investigation of these two factors –
besides the willingness of assuming risks – is the major criteria behind the deci-
sion to take over risks. Above and beyond comparing yields and risks differences
in accounting, taxation and legal rules might be taken into consideration as well.
From among risks arising in particular sectors financial instruments and methods
were developed to transfer and sell risks first of all in the credit and insurance mar-
ket and operational field. Credit risks are transferred mostly via securitisation to
the capital market and following that they very often end up in the balance sheet
of insurers. The transaction is concluded sometimes through direct sale. The
appearance of insurance risks in the capital market also often takes place through
securitisation, generally in the form of issuance of bonds connected to natural dis-
11
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portfolio, the underlying of which buyers do not have an overview, thus they have
no opportunity to influence the characteristics of the risks. In taking over market
risks there are no designated sectors or players, generally it involves a maturity
transformation. Each sector might be equally interested in transferring operational
risks; those who assume the risks are mostly insurance undertakings with direct
contracts or, with the help of securitisation, actors of the capital market.
2.1.1. Transfer of credit risks
Risk management regulations relating to banks are extremely strict regarding
credit risks. In order to cover expected losses banks have to build provisions and
for unexpected risks they have to present at least 8 per cent capital compared to
their risk weighted assets. Beyond that there are limits on concentration, which
motivate institutions to diversify their portfolios.
A strict regulatory framework containing quantitative requirements motivates cred-
it institutions to manage their credit portfolio in a way that their regulatory capital
requirement should come as close as possible to their real risks measured by them.
The most frequent case of the realization of these considerations is, when credits
of high quality clients are sold to members in sectors with less stringent regula-
tions. This is beneficial for insurance undertakings because they acquire invest-
ments with higher than risk-free yields, whereas they do not have to make lending
decisions, which require special knowledge. And banks may cut back their portfo-
lio of assets with 100 per cent risk weight.
2 Direct sale of client loans might be a
way out, even if the limit of large exposures is nearly reached. Banks appreciate
their contacts with clients built up over a long time and based on mutual confi-
dence sometimes more than the impulse to reject clients due to certain capacity or
administrative barriers. In such cases it is a regular business to sell client loans for




2 This incentive is expected to be eliminated by 2006, with the introduction of the new Basle capital
adequacy ratios. There will be a possibility to render 20 or 14 per cent risk weight-depending on the
method chosen - to the best qualifying corporate debts, which obviously cuts back the 8 per cent cap-
ital requirement to a similar extent.There are similar considerations behind the securitisation of debt portfolios when
banks sell their loans collected to the liquid capital market. Behind asset-backed
securities (ABS) issues of banks there are generally portfolios of homogenous debt
categories (mortgage and car loans, credit cards), which from the investors’ point
of view represent alternatives with different risks and simultaneously different
yields. Although the willingness to assume risks is by far not equal among market
players, a significant part of the insurance undertakings is willing to buy ABS
papers belonging to the lower segment of the investment category (with A or BBB
rating). Their aim is to take advantage of the interest differential compared to
bonds with the same rating. The other form of insurance sector participation is the
financial guarantee undertaken for ABS papers with high investment rating (AAA
or AA), or sureties via monolines.
3
Similarly to the ABS papers investment banks and other investment service
providers issue securities, which are covered by corporate bonds and debts pur-
chased on the secondary market. These so-called collateralised debt obligations
(CDO) are also becoming increasingly important in the portfolio of insurance com-
panies. Structured financial forms representing usually high quality debt allow
spreads on corporate bond yields in the same investment category to be skimmed
off. Furthermore, they have the favourable feature that they enable use to be made
of the benefits of diversification, since portfolios diversified among sectors and
geographical regions have lower individual risks. Portfolios represent different risk
categories, among which one can select according to risk appetite. That is the rea-
son why insurance undertakings are open for these and other investments made
through leverage, since this is the method whereby they are able to meet explicit-
ly the implicit expectations of investors regarding  attainable yields over and
above government paper yields.
Banks make use of the role undertaken by insurers and other institutional investors
when articulating their risk-managing attitude. Often they conclude insurance con-
tracts against political risks in the case of loans granted in less developed or devel-
oping countries, thus shifting systemic risk of their loans to the insurers.
13
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3 These are alliances of insurer companies with sufficient capital supply on their own, which provide
guarantee of timely payment for huge, high quality debt portfolios. Since they are highly leveraged,
they have to satisfy strict capital adequacy requirements and rating agencies also scrutinize their
activity.A group of credit derivatives is a proper measure for shifting over the total credit
risk. These types of derivatives offer coverage against a certain fee for the decla-
ration of the default of the client. The most widely used type is the credit default
swap (CDS). With this instrument investors agree to exchange a bank’s claim for
a certain amount of money following the occurrence of a predetermined event
(which is mostly the declaration of default). On aggregating similar contracts they
may create CDS portfolios. In this case, too, however, only high quality debts are
taken into consideration. The next group of credit derivatives is total return swaps
(TRS), which compensate the decline of interest collected below a certain level or
the deterioration of the debtor’s rating under a previously determined level.
The volume of debts sold through credit derivatives has been increasing since
1999, when the first survey by the British Bankers’ Association was made, and it
was higher than USD 1 trillion in 2001.
4
Another, relatively less popular form of insurance company involvement in credit
risks involves so-called contingent capital. This is a type of insurance whereby the
insurer agrees to raise capital in a bank following a credit risk-related trigger, for
example, if the annual credit losses of the bank rise above a certain value, through
purchasing equity or in the form of subscribing subordinated debt. Since the bank
can use this capital in the future as coverage of other risks, this form of insurance
is less frequent.
The common feature of the above-mentioned methods is that by using them cred-
it institutions are able to shape their capital position flexibly. In a growing econo-
my, when improvement in the capital position and decline in risks is expected, a
preliminary capital surplus may arise. Instruments developed to transfer credit
risks offer the possibility of making use of these surplus liabilities. And if the capi-
tal position is deteriorating, banks may seek remedy for the problem on the sell-
ers’ side in a flexible way. Thus, as a positive externality of risk transfer mecha-
nism, management of the income and capital position of banks will be easier,
which presumably decreases the cyclical fluctuation of these variables.
14
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4 OECD (2002).2.1.2. Transfer of insurance risks to the capital markets
Risks traditionally taken by insurance undertakings are non-financial risks arising
from accidental or not foreseeable events, which those insured have shifted over to
insurers against payment of a certain fee. The management of these risks is tradi-
tionally made through the reinsurance contracts of insurers. These contracts, how-
ever, will be re-negotiated each year, which means that conditions change accord-
ing to the prevailing premium level. If the capital of re-insurers preliminary declines
due to disbursements following large catastrophes and they have to raise prices,
insurers may sign contracts with them year by year at these prices only.
As an alternative, insurance undertakings have also appeared on the suppliers’
side of the risk transfer market. In this market they are able to cover their risks for
several years at predetermined prices independent of the cyclical price changes,
without being exposed to the high partner risk of reinsurers.
One of the most frequent forms of alternative risk transfer involves appearance on
the capital market in the form of securitisation. The point of the technique is that
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Primary source: British Bankers’ Associationcatastrophes, the buyers of which get proportionally lower interest or principal
redemption because of the compensation liability, if the insured event actually
occurs. These bonds target banks, pension funds and other mutual funds, for whom
insurance-based investments are especially favourable because they represent a
risk profile which is hardly in correlation with the traditional portfolio, which might
result in a considerable increase in risk-adjusted yields. The disadvantages of the
capital market solutions are, however, high transaction costs and low value of indi-
vidual contracts, which means they offer a real alternative only if the price of re-
insurance becomes considerably higher. The next problem is that there are only
partly reliable mathematical models available for risks represented by these securi-
ties, as a consequence of which these bonds’ rating is below investment category.
As we have seen before, transferring risks can have an important role in the balanc-
ing of the capital position of insurers, too. They use their surplus capital the more, and
to an increasing extent, to assume credit risks, and if their capital adequacy falls below
a critical level, they can counterbalance it on the alternative risk transfer markets.
2.1.3. Transfer of market risks
Due to the unevenness of cash flows and the inherent risks of investment assets
owned, none of the three sectors can be regarded as the main transferor or recip-
ient of market risks. As a general principle, institutions want to minimize the risks
of unforeseeable interest rate or exchange rate changes. One of the accepted
ways of that is the use of derivatives related to market instruments. In order to
eliminate interest rate risks bonds with an embedded option (callable or puttable)
might be issued connected to predetermined interest levels. Insurers may neutral-
ize the liquidity risk of exercising the options built into their products by buying or
issuing similar callable or puttable bonds, which are flexible in maturity. Mostly in
the case of pension funds it happens that they conclude swaption deals to ensure
guaranteed yields in the long run. In these cases by calling the option an interest
rate swap starts: the fund pays a predetermined floating yield, against which it gets




5 This instrument is an appropriate method for covering foreign exchange risks as well, with the mod-
ification that swap takes place on an occurring predetermined foreign exchange rate, instead of on a
predetermined interest rate level.Participants, however, can create completely hedged positions only very rarely,
since the special products in the portfolios and their maturity is different from that
of the instruments traded. Consequently, a certain level of basis risk – as a con-
comitant of most derivative transactions – still falls on the institutions. Long-term
OTC derivatives, on the other hand, as an alternative against standard products
traded in large volumes, generate high-level partner risks.
2.1.4. Transfer of operational risks
Operational risk is a special type of risk inherent in the activity of financial
institutions, in the case of which there is no chance of closing the position
quickly and free of costs –unlike in the previous cases. Consequently, all sec-
tors are interested in lessening the damaging effects of these types of risk
which are handled as inherent features, which can not be eliminated com-
pletely and which are not to be diversified within the institution. As a solution
for handling these risks, setting aside a certain amount of capital,
6 the insur-
ing and placing of them in the capital market are offered – just like in the pre-
vious cases.
Insurance contracted on operational risks is a relatively cost-effective
method, which shifts damaging consequences to an external party in
exchange for paying a fixed amount. Contracts like this are also regarded as
a positive factor by credit rating agencies in their analysis. The most impor-
tant product known in this field is the Financial Institutions Operational Risk
Insurance (FIORI), elaborated by Swiss Re for the institutions of the financial
sector, which refunds about 68 per cent of the damages arising from opera-
tional risks known until now. As a disadvantage of the insurance construction
it is often cited that it covers only risk to be expressed in numbers, and the
speed of refunding after the damage is uncertain. The insurer might also dis-
pute the legal basis of the refunding, and, above all, the limited capacity of
insurers might also be an obstacle. Moreover, it can be a problem that the
coverage provided by insurers may not compensate damages caused by long-
17
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6 This might happen on a voluntary basis, too. The inauguration of the Basle recommendation, howev-
er, might cause a turnaround in this field by defining the volume of the capital expected by regulators.term reputation effects. On the side of the recipient of the services the sepa-
rated development of insurance and capital strategies might be a problem in
realizing the actual extent of the coverage.
The selling of operational risks on the capital market is not yet a frequent solu-
tion. The most important reason for this is the lack of the unified market, due
to the uncertainties in pricing. Insurers on the supply side could encourage
commencing of trade the most, by quoting prices they could ensure the required
liquidity.
2.1.5. Risks from the point of view of regulation
Subsequent to assuming risks there might be more factors behind its re-allocation
and selling. One of them is the use of efficient risk managing methods, but the
use of diversification effects and the differences in the regulations should be
regarded as well. The higher the difference between the real danger of risks and
capital requirements expected as coverage, the greater the push for different cap-
ital adequacy requirements of individual sectors to rearrange portfolios. In particu-
lar, unregulated insurance risks assumed by banks and the capital requirement of
insurers’ investments – over and above diversification requirement – and the need
to consolidate the limits with similar content should to be mentioned from among
unsolved problems in cross-sectoral regulation.
From the viewpoint of systemic stability, the efficient allocation of risks on its
own does not threaten the financial system. On the side of regulators, increasing
risk awareness is to be understood as a positive development. Nevertheless, the
drastic increase in volumes traded in the risk transfer markets in recent years
raises doubts about whether investors made a comprehensive analysis of risks
prior to concluding their deals. In any case, regulators have to consider the so-
called learning curve risk, since, due to considerable differences between the
environment of banking and insurance, which is manifested in the legal regula-
tions, the two sectors can close up more rapidly than the understanding of each
other’s risks.
Ways of realization of risk transfer might be quite different regarding the extent of
coverage, too. The core activity of insurers is precisely the commitment without
18
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er, this involves the taking over of an ever growing volume of credit portfolios, the
lack of coverage and the impossibility of tracing commitments may generate even
a systemic risk if the insurance event occurs. This is especially true for monolines,
the insurance associations which undertake credit risk of low risk profile portfolios
in large volumes. Their commitments are usually based on the ratings of rating
agencies, but the most important disciplinary force in assuming risks is also the
evaluation of the credit rating agencies on the stance of the institution. The exter-
nal rating, often the sole evaluation approach, however, means another risk factor
as the transmission is growing between those who know the real position of the
debtors and those who bear the credit risk.
Another problem regarding the safety of the financial system is the growing mutu-
al dependence between the two institutions on both sides of the risk transfer due to
long-term transactions. The seller has to follow continuously the position of the
debtor. The buyer, however, has to stand for the debtor in case of default. Often
banks continuously investigate the capital position of their partner insurers in order
to be convinced of their efficiency.
7
Regulatory authorities have to be in the position to handle new financial instru-
ments and investment forms. Due to sharpening market competition and high
yield promises to investors, the increasing risk awareness of market actors is often
accompanied by a growing propensity to assume risks. Institutions responsible for
systemic risk have to be in a position to follow the flow of risks, and to be aware
of who is bearing ultimately the non-expected risks turning up in the three sectors.
They must also be aware that the concentration of risks does not reach a critical
level. As a result of cross-sectoral harmonization a regulatory structure is to be
developed, where similar types of risks are treated in the same way, i.e. capital
adequacy regulations are not different from each other. This is the only way to
achieve an adequate level of capital coverage against non-expected risks turning
up in any of the sectors.
19
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7 Besides efficiency, however, insurers also have to have a willingness to pay, in order to avoid the suf-
fering of banks in the case of the debtor’s default. Following the fall of Enron in December 2001,
insurers refused payment, referring to the fact that J.P. Morgan Chase Bank lent credits to the com-
pany knowing that it would not be able to refund the debt. (The Economist, January 26 2002) The
occurrences of insurance events of this type are serious touchstones of the viability of credit risk
insurance constructions.2.2. Cross-sectoral investments
The complete institutional separation of financial service providers can be elimi-
nated in many ways. Mergers and fusions are possible milestones in the develop-
ment of conglomerates. Tight business contacts with total institutional separation
– for example buying, insuring or transforming risks through different derivatives –
is a probable method of the manifestation of financial convergence. Moreover,
there are also partial acquisitions and investments among institutions acting in dif-
ferent financial sectors.
Behind cross-sectoral investments there are generally strategic considerations,
since organizations often look for possibilities in using more complex marketing
channels or products to ensure their development. Finding a strategic partner is the
most obvious way to widen the scope of services offered, instead of implementing
an expensive product development. Agreements legitimated with investments or
partial cross-ownerships might be different regarding the depth of the cooperation.
The first step in the cooperation is the use of cross-selling channels. The so-called
packaging needs a tighter integration, when standard products sold in both sectors
in large volumes (i.e. banking and insurance) will be offered combined with each
other in one place. By intensifying this contact new, comprehensive financial prod-
ucts could also be developed. On a higher level of financial intermediators’ pro-
gressive integration, possible synergic effects could be used more intensively. This
might be evident first of all in declining costs, but it can be manifested in a con-
siderable decline in risks due to diversification.
The intensification of cooperation can be hindered in several ways. The most fre-
quent ones, however, are the limits in the scope of activity set by regulators (see
later on in detail). These might involve provisions encouraging the maintenance of
the separate legal entity status of the institution – for example through differences
in the calculation of the capital requirement – but they can be manifested in actu-
al prohibitions, too. 
20
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An increasing number of institutions try to overcome the problem of the ever grow-
ing range of products in the financial markets and the increasing pressure to exploit
advantages of efficiency by integrating financial services to the largest degree pos-
sible. The vanishing of borderlines between the three big sectors and institutions
representing them in the last ten years has resulted in the establishment of finan-
cial conglomerates acting as dominant players in the market.
The specialty of the conglomerates is that several organizations with significantly dif-
ferent activity will come under common leadership. In the institutions of financial
conglomerates at least two of the banking, security-trading or insurance activities are
represented, whereas the whole of the conglomerate’s operation is explicitly con-
nected with these financial sectors. However, there are also conglomerates where
non-financial activity is dominant (for example in trade or car manufacturing).
8
The definition of a financial conglomerate is by no means coherent due to the dif-
ferences in individual countries in both financial structure and the techniques of
regulation. Since the possible scope of activity of banks is just as different in indi-
vidual geographical regions as the definition of insurance activities, or the connec-
tion of banking and security trading activities, there is no precise and consistent
definition. The Tripartite Group, the conciliation group set up by the regulators of
the three financial sectors defined a conglomerate as follows:
A group of companies under common leadership, the exclusive or dominant activi-
ty of which incorporates at least two of the services provided by the three financial
sectors (banking, investment services and insurance).
9
3.1.1. Factors behind the establishment of conglomerates
The most frequently cited consideration behind the setting up of conglomerates is the
exploitation of cost benefits. Service providers in different sectors can sell each
other’s products to their existing clientele while cutting back administrative, market-
ing and operational costs. In a different interpretation: in a consolidated organization,
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8 The actual category of these can differ by countries. 
9 Tripartite Group of Banking, Securities and Insurance Regulators (1995).at a given level of fixed costs, the efficiency of selling is increasing, whereas the scale
of products offered is growing. It may have quite important benefits that, with the
merger of influential service providers in different sectors, diversification among
products and regions may result in a significant decline in risks. Legal, cultural and
taxation considerations, the extent of market concentration and the specialties in
the development of the financial intermediation system of a given country are
involved with these benefits, too. Finally, deregulation in the previous period and
cross-border activities resulting from the formation of the unified European market
can be mentioned among the factors motivating the establishment of conglomerates.
3.1.2. Forms realized in practice
The financial conglomerate is not a new organizational form. Already twenty years
ago in the United States there was a wave of conglomeration in the retail financial
sector with the purpose of establishing financial supermarkets. At that time the
legal regulation in force prohibited the setting up of universal banks, thus an activ-
ity involving a wide range of financial services could be started only with the estab-
lishment of conglomerates. It was then that Sears acquired Dean Witter and
Coldwell Banker, American Express bought Shearson, Bank of America purchased
Schwab, and Prudential obtained Bache. Enthusiasm, however, faded quite quick-
ly, and the concept of specialization and quality service came in the foreground
again in the early eighties. 
Globalisation and the development of technology, however, gave an impetus again
to bringing about international holding companies. Considerations of increasing the
efficiency of an organization’s operation, which constituted the clear motivation
behind the establishment of conglomerates in the past ten years, were realized in
practice first of all through acquisitions made by big institutions with high capital
strength. The expansions of the Hollander ING Group, the German insurer, Allianz
or Deutsche Bank are examples of this.
The growing interaction within companies in different sectors – in parallel with positive
changes in regulation, or probably with a special licence prior to that – resulted in
many cases in mergers.  Generally, this was accompanied by the rise of stock
exchange prices, which inspired company managers to establish ever bigger and
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background. From among cross-sectoral mergers the most widely cited example is
the establishment of Citigroup by the merger of Citibank and Travelers Group in 1998.
Occasionally, generally in countries with less developed financial markets, it hap-
pens that a dominating institution – in most cases a bank – takes up activity in
another sector through founding a company. In Hungary the OTP Group makes use
of this technique.
3.2. Challenges for regulation 
Financial conglomerates represent a new structural element in the financial interme-
diation system with their magnitudes and volumes of transactions, which represents
an unprecedented challenge for the regulatory authorities. The magnitude of their
cross-border activity intertwining economic systems is considerably beyond of that
of previous institutions acting within the borders of a country. The economic strength
based on that and the legislative influence is also much more dominant than it was
earlier. The high volume in itself deserves special regulatory attention. In addition, the
diverging activity of these organizations often involves potential dangers due to the
complexity of the connection network, which would not appear in the case of sepa-
rated institutions. The leaders of conglomerates, however, often conclude transactions
that aim at circumventing prudential regulations. Below we first investigate problems
arising due to the complexity of organizations. Then follow contagion effects, which
can be triggered by market developments but they may happen through intra-group
transactions, too, if risk sources are not separated efficiently. Later, we introduce
briefly the characteristic forms of deliberate violation of prudential regulations.
3.2.1. Complexity
Systemic stability effect. The activity of conglomerates dominating the financial
system might cause a serious danger to the stability of the financial system of the
country where it operates. The high level of aggregation and the coordination and
risk management of widespread activity generates a growing operational risk,
which increases the instability of institutions even in the case of prudent operation.
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source of moral hazard, too, since extreme risks and activities assumed under
the principle of “too big to fail” are the consequences of a virtually enlarged
scope of activity due to the opaqueness of operation. An additional manifesta-
tion of moral hazard occurs when an extreme extent of risks are shifted to the
banking division within the conglomerate, with the presumption that ultimately
the risks of banks might be shifted over to the deposit insurance system or the
central bank.
3.2.2. The danger of contagion
Risk concentration in the traditional sense. In the case of member companies
operating in parallel with each other in various sectors, the problem of assuming
large exposures is an especially important one. Investigation of this problem must
be concluded in several dimensions. When investigating credit or market risks, the
concentrated claim against one client or sector means an extreme exposure. This
is risk concentration in the traditional sense, which is to be avoided by creating
quantitative limits inspiring diversification.
Risks concentration due to the presence in more sectors. In the case of financial
conglomerates, however, the occurrence of one certain event may influence
diverging risk factors of different sectors in a similar way. The most obvious exam-
ple of this is the consequence of natural disasters, which – besides the losses suf-
fered by insurers –may also cause difficulty in the banking sector due to insolvent
debtors. The interaction of risk factors in different sectors might be apparent fol-
lowing certain money market events, for example devaluations, when deterioration
of the repayment capacity of banking clients is accompanied by the loss of value
in securities portfolios. The changing mood of investors due to negative develop-
ments in one or the other developing country
10 may result a collective flight from
instruments previously regarded as uncorrelated, which might badly shake finan-
cial institutions operating in the country given. 
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10 This phenomenon is called “flight to quality”.Risks concentration enforced by the market. In the case of conglomerates, the
risk concentration effects of one sector spread over automatically to the mem-
bers operating in other sectors. This occurs partly via intra-group transactions on
the one hand, and the reputation effect enforced by third partners on the other.
If, for example, there are severe losses in the brokerage or insurance division of
the conglomerate, that may cause liquidity problems in the partner bank, espe-
cially, if clients reasonably suppose a tight business relationship between the two
institutions.
Risk profile transforming effects of intra-group transactions. From among the
factors motivating the establishment of conglomerates the most important ones are
cuts in costs through intra-group transactions, benefits in the fields of risk man-
agement, and efficient allocation of liabilities and capital available. Regarding their
form of manifestation they are the following:
– Cross shareholdings
– Trading operations among group companies 
– Central management of short-term liquidity within the conglomerate
– Providing loans, guarantees or commitments within the group
– Provision of management services against fee
– Risk transfer via reinsurance
– Allocation of client claims or commitments among group members
The existence of intra-group transactions on its own does not represent a challenge
for regulators, since these have a decisive role in achieving the above-mentioned
efficiency targets. Nevertheless, the complex organizational structure and the big
volume of intra-group transactions might cause a contagion effect, in the course
of which the financial difficulties of one member of the conglomerate, without effi-
cient firewalls, may spread over to a properly operating member, too.
3.2.3. Regulatory arbitrage
Regulatory arbitrage via intra-group transactions. The instruments introduced
above are appropriate for realizing the phenomenon known as regulatory arbitrage,
which means the reorientation of the activity of regulated institutions to members,
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to follow continuously internal transactions in order to be convinced of the fact that
these do not cause any harm either to the clients’ or the member institutions’ inter-
est. Transactions are harmful if they
– serve capital or revenue transfers from regulated member companies in order to
avoid prudential regulation
– are on terms which parties operating at arm’s length would not allow (i.e. differ-
ences in prices, fees, commissions against market terms) and which may put the
regulated company in an unfavourable situation
– can adversely affect the solvency, liquidity or profitability of individual member
companies
– involve regulatory arbitrage, which aims at circumventing capital adequacy or
other requirements.
Multiple gearing within the group. From among techniques connected with the
capital adequacy of conglomerates the most widely used is double or multiple
gearing. With this technique more than one member company denotes the same
capital element as a capital coverage available for covering risks. The core inter-
est of regulating authorities is to prevent this action, since the real capital situation
of the conglomerate, i.e. its risk-absorbing capacity, will be worse than indicated
by the aggregated individual capital adequacy. 
Indicating credit as capital. It may cause similar problems if the parent institution
acquires funds by rising loans, which it allocates into the subsidiary company as
capital. This is the so-called excessive leverage, which may cause refunding prob-
lems if unexpected risks occur. The same problem can occur if subordinated cap-
ital elements raised by the parent company are transferred to the subsidiary as
primary capital elements.
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3.3.1. Presentation of inadequacies in international cooperation
apropos the BCCI case 
The Bank of Credit and Commerce International S.A. (BCCI) was presumably
established by its founders right from the beginning with the purpose of circum-
venting all regulatory control. By creating an organizational structure divided
among several countries, operating even within the holding in a very complex
structure, consisting of parent companies and subsidiaries, a mesh of bank-in-
bank transactions, and both open and secret deals among each other, the founders
were successful in bringing about a situation whereby neither any state supervision
nor any auditor had an overview of the complexity of the organization’s activity. By
splitting its organizational structure, book keeping, supervision and auditing, the
BCCI group got tangled in a series of activities forbidden by legal rules, among
them money laundering, bribery, illegal immigration, support of terrorism, man-
agement of prostitution, tax evasion and a host of illegal financial activities – all this
in 73 countries, among them the Unites States and Great Britain, as a multination-
al holding, for more than 20 years.
3.3.1.1. Organizational structure
BCCI holding and one of its subsidiaries operating as a bank were registered in
Luxembourg in the early seventies. However, none of the parties executed a bank-
ing activity in this country. The other registered office of BCCI was in the Grand
Caymans, famous for easy bank establishment and relaxed rules of control. The
international transactions of BCCI were made in the London office, which was only
a head office. Consequently, the scope of investigation of the Bank of England’s
prudential supervision vis-à-vis a head office was quite limited. In principle, com-
pulsory auditory reports should have called attention to the violation of financial
and accountancy discipline and other illegitimacies. With the decision that BCCI
divided its auditors between the offices in Luxembourg and the Great Caymans, it
managed to avoid having any complete overview of its activities.
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BCCI managed to infiltrate the financial market of each country it targeted, includ-
ing the United States and Great Britain. As a first step, it created Commerce and
Credit American Holding (CCAH), which as an independent institution got a
licence from the Federal Reserve three years later to buy the bank Financial
General Bankshares (FGB). Since the Federal Reserve wanted to prevent BCCI
collecting deposits in the United States, it compelled CCAH to make a statement
that BCCI did not exert any influence on its activity. The statement, however,
offered the possibility for BCCI to supply information for the shareholders of CCAH
in the capacity of an investment service provider and thus to continue to influence
the operation of the holding. Later, BCCI opened branches in several federal states
– which was a legal opportunity. In parallel with that, however, it continued with
secret bank acquisitions, mostly through nominees, and there was no regulatory
counteraction to this. The ultimate goal of the strategy was to merge these branch-
es and banks, which was realized under the name of First American Bank in 1986.
The Comptroller of the Currency got knowledge of the acquiring influence of BCCI
through nominees and not existing persons in the management of Bank of America
and the National Bank of Georgia, though this information was not passed to the
Federal Reserve. The Federal Reserve initiated a comprehensive investigation only
on 3 January 1991, when it got a clear picture about the extent and ways of BCCI’s
series of frauds. Nevertheless, it did not commence the closing down of the multi-
national bank. For the sake of US depositors and the internal market it obtained a
USD 190 million contribution from BCCI’s principal shareholders in the United
Arab Emirates, which was the genuine domicile of the holding, to raise capital in
First American and to avoid failure.
It has to be stated that the secret banking operations and accomplishment of
acquisitions of BCCI in the United States were enabled by the lack of fundamental
cooperation among banking supervision regulatory authorities such as the Federal
Reserve, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency.
The lack of international contacts among supervisory authorities and their con-
flicting interests is reflected in the behaviour of the Bank of England, too. The
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Kingdom from the end of the seventies, due to the dubious reputation of the hold-
ing. Although in 1988-89 it obtained exact information about BCCI’s activities in
connection with financing terrorism and money laundering, it did not make any sig-
nificant move. The first such move was made in early 1990, when Price
Waterhouse reported on the considerable loan losses of BCCI, its questionable
banking activities, on the suspicion of fraud and the extent of expected losses due
to all that. Subsequently, the Bank of England did not initiate the liquidation of
BCCI; on the contrary, it decided to restructure and back up the holding. Making
use of the stipulations regarding bank secrecy and confidential handling of infor-
mation, it did not reveal the real position of the holding to investors and other reg-
ulators, and it drafted a restructuring programme. Pursuant to this programme the
government of the Emirates would have consolidated BCCI, Price Waterhouse
would have countersigned the books for one more year, and the Bank of England
would have agreed that the holding would be divided into three parts with head
offices in London, Hong Kong and Abu Dhabi. The plan was obstructed by an
accusatory measure of the New York district attorney in June 1991.
3.3.1.3. The failure
The New York district attorney commenced an investigation into the transactions of
BCCI in 1989, first of all on the laundering of money originating from the drug trade.
One impact of the questions put by the district attorney was that Price Waterhouse
UK, the auditor of BCCI in Britain, initiated a comprehensive investigation, and this
investigation accelerated the inspection of the Federal Reserve regarding identifica-
tion of the owners of First American. This investigation and the accusation set forth
impeded realization of the reorganization programme of the Bank of England, since
a procedure like that would have resulted in a run against the worldwide network of
the bank. Additionally, the evidence that BCCI had pursued illegal activity would
have involved a huge loss of reputation for the Bank of England, if it turned out that
the latter had participated in the reorganization of BCCI. 
The actions of supervisory authorities accelerated in 1991, when the Luxembourg,
the Grand Caymans, the British, and US authorities all took measures to draw the
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With the collapse of the worldwide network millions of depositors suffered losses,
and although the wide-ranging investigation brought a lot of things to the surface,
the management escaped being called to account due to the resistance of the
authorities in Abu Dhabi.
3.3.1.4. Lessons
The activity and failure of BCCI was a widely discussed topic among both
European and US regulators. The transactions, connections, large volume money
laundering and other illegal activities of BCCI, and the fact that it could engage in
these for more than twenty years induced the creators of prudential regulatory
frameworks to undertake serious self-investigation all over the word. Within one
year following the failure of the bank, rules regulating foreign banks and bank hold-
ings were supplemented both in the United States and in the EU. The legal rules in
the US
11 stipulate as a precondition of the issuance of an operational license the
consolidated supervision of the foreign owners of banks according to domicile, and
they enable local regulators to obtain access to all relevant information. With this,
even the possibility of covering up illegal activities by relying on bank secrecy was
eliminated. Moreover, in order to avoid other anomalies, the financial, monitoring
and operational conditions of domestic and foreign banks were harmonized.
The expansion of BCCI in the United States went on mostly through shareholders
nominees. Thus, BCCI obtained voting shares in US banks while avoiding the strict
regulations of the FED. This called the attention to the fact that the transparency
offered by ownership rules was not satisfactory. Since that time, above a certain
order of magnitude owners have to show up even in person to inform regulators
about their identity. In addition, important steps were made to make the real trans-
parency of an institution’s operation, its management, decision-making structure
and responsibility apparent. 
The most important lesson of the BCCI case is the lack of international coopera-
tion of the regulatory authorities. Since national supervisory authorities were pri-
marily interested in the protection of depositors in their own country, when con-
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in other countries. Thus, on the one hand, they deprived themselves of the others’
information, and they postponed liquidation on the other, with the consequence
that the money of a lot more depositors got stuck in BCCI. The result was that 60-
90 per cent of the deposit portfolio estimated at USD 20 billion disappeared. The
careless restructuring effort of the Bank of England meant that the major part of
the incriminating documentation ended up in Abu Dhabi, the destination of the
managers, who were able to avoid being called to account. 
3.3.2. The failure of Baring Brothers
3.3.2.1. Events leading to the failure
Barings hit the headlines in early 1995, when it turned out that one single broker
in its Asian securities branch had ruined the historical financial institution, which
the Dutch ING Bank eventually purchased for a symbolic price of one pound. How
could one single person lose all the capital of a 233-year old bank, specifically
USD 1.4 billion? Nick Leeson was posted to Singapore as a futures trader in 1992,
and he was given strict intra-day volumes and product specific limits.
12 From July
1992, however, he engaged deliberately in unauthorized trading in futures and
options. By the end of 1994 he had accumulated losses of about GBP 208 million
on an account, the transactions of which he kept secret from his superiors. He was
able to do this because he was responsible for both settlement and trading activi-
ties, thus there was no efficient control over the futures transactions concluded by
him. Leeson, concealing the accumulated losses, reported a profit ten times the
result of the previous years, leading to the satisfaction and confidence of his supe-
riors. They understood that the profit was made from arbitrage on the Osaka (OSE)
and Singapore (SIMEX) stock exchanges for the same products, so it was a risk
free activity for Barings. By January 1995, however, the losses were so high that
he had to increase his speculative activities. By 23 February he had purchased
futures stock indices in an amount of USD 7 billion and sold futures bond contracts
for USD 20 billion on his own. Additionally, he built up options positions, which
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12 Among them, he had no authority to trade in options, only on behalf of clients.offered a profit should there be less market fluctuation than the volatility built in
into the positions. The earthquake in Kobe, however, shook the market and Leeson
to counterbalance it – to hinder the decline in prices – purchased Nikkei futures
contracts in huge volumes. In the end, however, there was still a drastic decline in
prices leading to the collapse of Leeson’s positions and Barings Bank as a whole.
3.3.2.2. Factors enabling the series of frauds
In view of the position volumes built up, the first question concerns how these were
concealed from the management, the regulators and auditors, right up to the
occurrence of failure.
From among management problems, the one-man responsibility of both front
office and back office activities is the most important. Although the incorrectness
of this technique was indicated by the treasurer of the group early in 1994 – and
this was reinforced by the internal audit in August 1994 – due to the failure of
internal communication nothing happened to split these functions. The managers
in London did not start to make inquiries about the real nature of the activities of
Barings Futures Singapore (the direct employer of Leeson), even though SIMEX
indicated its concerns regarding the accounts kept with it and the neglect of mar-
gin requirements in two letters in January 1995. Ex post investigations revealed
the fact that Leeson did not have a responsible superior who would have moni-
tored his activities and led his operation. Thus it was possible for the trader to
have access to continuous liquidity from his parent company to maintain posi-
tions
13 without any control. The London centre satisfied the need for liquidity on
the condition that this was loan extended for clients, which would be used to meet
the margin requirements of the positions in Singapore. Nevertheless, the loans
extended in this way were not reconciled with the clients’ accounts in London,
such that the real use of uncovered transfers remained concealed. By February
1995, however, the financing need of positions became so acute that these trans-
fers were not sufficient. From that point on Leeson made his superiors approve
large amounts of payments with the indication that the money did not reach the
original beneficiary, although the mistaken addressee refunded it. But even these
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13 The amount of this at the time of failure was GBP 300 million.“insufficiencies in operation” did not awake suspicion enough in the management
to look into the matter.
The management also made a big mistake in the respect that it did not enter these
additional transfers into the large exposure registers. If they had been managed
properly as client loans, they should have turned up in the gross limits of the par-
ticular debtors. On the other hand, if they had been transferred to Singapore to the
own account trade, they should have been entered into the large exposure regis-
ters against the Singapore subsidiary, and as an exposure against SIMEX on a con-
solidated basis.
All this is also worth investigating from the perspective of the regulators. At that
time the Bank of England
14 performed the consolidated supervision of the Barings
Group. Prior to 1 January 1994, when the large exposure directive of the EU
15
entered into force, the Bank of England was authorized to exempt banks from large
exposure limits, if those informed it in advance about the purpose and conditions
of assuming the position. In this sense Barings got an “informal exemption” from
one official of the Bank of England regarding its positions assumed against OSE.
Although the extension of this exemption was beyond the authority of the official,
there was no upper limit to these allowances. Following the allowance, Barings
used it arbitrarily in its positions assumed against SIMEX and later on it even failed
in its obligation to make a prior announcement. As a result, its accumulated posi-
tion against the two stock exchanges was in February 1995 – expressed in the own
funds – 73 or 40 per cent.
16
The preliminary authorization of the solo consolidation
17 of Baring Brothers PLC
and Barings Securities London (BSL) was also the responsibility of the Bank of
England, since BFS had concluded deals in the name of the latter in the Far East.
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14 The act on the UK central bank of 1996 ended this activity of the BoE and the task was taken over
by the integrated supervisory authority, the Financial Services Authority.
15 Following the entering into force of the Directive – excluding some exceptional cases – there was no
possibility to assume positions over 25 per cent of the capital base in the case of one client.
16 Obviously, even after entering into force of the Directive there was no change in the practice of the
BoE regarding extending large exposure exemptions. Barings received a message from the BoE on 
1 February 1995 indicating that it would not tolerate any exceeding of the 25 % limit against the given
stock exchanges.
17 Solo consolidation is a special consolidation procedure acknowledged by the British banking super-
vision. The gist of it is that the contact is so tight between the parent company and its subsidiary that
they prepare common reports –with full-scale consolidation of their assets and liabilities – and they
are exempted from preparing individual reports. This method was invented to solve the contradiction
between legal independence and tight operational cooperation.Since the solo consolidation of the two financial institutions beginning in 1992 was
a novelty in British practice and for the BoE too, due to the uncertainties of the con-
solidation procedure the sanction measures in relation to the failures of large expo-
sure reports were not applied to BSL. Due to the consolidation in progress, the BoE
regarded the securities firm – without any surveillance of the process – as part of
the bank, and it considered its capital adequacy and large exposure limit in terms
of the consolidated numbers. It was a consequence of the informal licensing of solo
consolidation, too, that there were no limits regarding the volume of institutions’
transactions among each other. Thus big amounts could be transacted unhindered
– on Leeson’s initiative – to the BFS, without any supervisory consideration. In the
meantime, Barings presented the profit of BSL among the non-consolidated data.
So, the conclusion can be drawn that the BoE did not deal with the problem of con-
solidation with such care as would have been necessary in view of the novelty of
the process.
All things considered, it can be stated that this unique case, where one single per-
son could bankrupt a financial institution with reputation, was able to occur due to
the simultaneous existence of several bad techniques. The regulatory aspects of
the failure of Barings relevant from the point of view of this study are the following:
1. The relationship between BFS and BSL was not obvious for regulators. This
means that Barings was unable to prepare an adequate consolidated financial
report, either for itself or for the regulators.
2. The bank was unable to give a real picture of its large exposure, or it concealed
that from regulators.
3. The case generated a lot of questions connected with the supervisory responsi-
bility of the Bank of England. The excessive exposure causing the failure of
Barings can be connected with the lack of rigour in enforcing the 25% large
exposure limit and the level of management granting concessions.
4. The Bank of England did not investigate directly the overseas subsidiaries of
Barings. It used the reports of the bank and the auditors only – despite the huge
profit reported.
5. The Bank of England preliminarily approved the solo consolidation of Baring
Brothers PLC and BSL, without properly analysing the securities firm’s transac-
tions. Following that, there was no limit regarding the transactions between the
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positions of BFS, the subsidiary of BSL, remained hidden until the moment of
failure.
3.4. Regulatory responses
3.4.1. The activity of the Joint Forum
The Joint Forum on Financial Conglomerates (Joint Forum) was established in
1996 with the participation of the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision
(BCBS), the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and
the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS). The forum took over
the work of the Tripartite Group formed informally, which investigated the prob-
lems of financial conglomerates from 1993 from a regulatory point of view. The
Forum includes staff members of banking, insurance and security supervisions in
13 countries, delegated by parent organizations. The purpose of the Joint Forum
is, on the one hand, to eliminate obstacles in the way of regulatory authorities’
cooperation and, on the other, to elaborate concrete principles to support efficient
regulation of financial conglomerates. The Forum started consultation on its
research papers among sector representatives and national regulatory authorities.
The purpose of the consultation process was to learn about the standpoint of mar-
ket players and regulators concerning the principles elaborated by the Forum and
to collect proposals connected with it. The Joint Forum continuously investigates
the feasibility of principles elaborated and it makes efforts to build these into the
national regulatory structures as soon as possible.
3.4.1.1. Deviations and inadequacies revealed during the cross-sectoral cooperation 
The Joint Forum set up a working group in 2000 with the purpose of comparing
principles elaborated by each parent organization individually, and to help the iden-
tification of possible differences. The principles serving as the basis of the work are:
The principles of efficient banking supervision (September 1999) and its methodolo-
gy (October 1999), Principles of insurance and the connected methodology (October
35
OCCASIONAL PAPERS2000) and  Principles of securities regulation and its purposes (September 1998).
These are to be regarded as recommendations to the supervisions of the individual
member countries; their application is not compulsory. Nevertheless, both market
participants and financial organizations regard implementation of these recommen-
dations into national regulation as a primary stability indicator.
First the difference in the sectors’ activities, then the structural differences of
principles laid down require that the comparison should be made focusing on
themes. This meant that the working group compiled the list of questions relevant
in the view of regulators; then it investigated what recommendations international
organizations of individual sectors made regarding these questions. There were
important themes which were handled by all of the three collections of principles
more or less similarly. For example, the operation of supervisory structures, the
handling of supervised institutions and the prescription of certain prudential
requirements. In the definition of markets or clients, however, there were differ-
ences. Regarding all these, the working group drew the conclusion that there is nei-
ther a fundamental conflict nor a contradiction in the regulatory environment of the
three related sectors.
Nevertheless, there were groups of questions where there is no explanation for the
deviations in the opinions, either because of differences in activities, or in defini-
tions. We specify below the areas showing differences, where, although the differ-
ence in activities is not insignificant, there is some room to draw things together.
(See Table 1)
Although there was considerable progress in some aspects since the definition of
principles (for example in the elaboration of a consolidated capital adequacy sys-
tem of insurance companies), there is a lot do to in the convergence of superviso-
ry systems. Although the remit of the working group does not include the formula-
tion of recommendations, members still identified issues which they think should
be harmonized. 
In order to clarify inconsistencies and misunderstandings, they consider the recon-
ciliation of the essence of principles as a basic question. In their opinion it would
be necessary to clarify or elaborate basic definitions together. At the same time,
they mention the common definition or the essence of the consolidated supervi-
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against a partner, a sec-




proportion of portfolio to
be invested into individ-
ual groups of assets.  
Definition of the maxi-
mum level of positions
to be assumed in indi-
vidual instruments.  
Solvency The most comprehen-
sive risk-based prescrip-




pened only in this field. 
Sufficiency of capital
compared to the volume
and complexity of the
institution. 
Requiring maintenance
of market players’ liquid-
ity.  
Accountancy rules Special methods apply,
which are only neces-




relying on the sector. 









Reconciliation among sectors, the evaluation of other sector’s principles or, while
modifying them, the observance of other sector’s interests all represent concrete
forms of co-operation.
Finally, they consider the problem-oriented re-evaluation of principles inevitable,
considering the new phenomena in the financial sector, such as electronic banking
or the expansion of financial conglomerates.
3.4.1.2. Regulatory recommendations completed 
3.4.1.2.1. Concentration of risks 
Recommendations announced by the Joint Forum specify several dimensions con-
cerning large exposures. Thus, a reliable risk management has to include a clear
scope of responsibility, a comprehensive system to reveal, measure and manage
core risks, a limit system confining exposure, and a stress-test to estimate the prob-
ability of the coincidence of risks, a scenario and correlation analysis. Attention
should be paid to measurable and non-measurable risks. Regarding the manage-
ment of large exposure, the Joint Forum enumerated the following principles:
1. Regulators have to ensure – directly of through the regulated members – that
conglomerates should dispose of appropriate risk management instruments to
manage group-wide concentration of risks. In order to achieve this position reg-
ulators may engage in several steps, which they can enforce occasionally
through defining supervisory limits.
2. Regulators have to follow risk concentration systematically by means of
reports and other measures in order to have a clear picture about the exposure
of conglomerates.
3. Regulators have to contribute to the disclosure of risk concentration.
4. Regulators (acting in different sectors or countries) have to cooperate in order
to obtain a clear picture of individual conglomerates and so they could intervene
in a coordinated way if necessary.
5. Regulators have to implement necessary intervention efficiently and in a prop-
er way, if they consider that this is justified regarding the regulated members or
the group as a whole.40
OCCASIONAL PAPERS
3.4.1.2.2. Intra-group transactions 
The Joint Forum summarized its principles regarding intra-group transactions very
similarly to the principles elaborated relating to the management of large expo-
sures. Correspondingly, the highlighted questions are also identical, which, how-
ever, is not controversial regarding the differences in the nature of risks. 
The most important responsibility of regulators regarding intra-group transactions
is to ensure that conglomerates should manage properly internal transactions,
which are considered as problematic, excessive in volume or concluded with an
inappropriate distance. Regulators have to hinder the creation of manipulative and
damaging internal transactions in a preventive way, first of all by using limits.
Observation of limits and the detailed analysis of transactions should be support-
ed by the comprehensive investigation of consolidated and non-consolidated finan-
cial reports. Beyond that they should be convinced that the internal audit functions
of the conglomerate are adequate to avoid damaging consequences. Throughout
the licensing of mergers and fusion special attention is to be paid to the intra-group
transaction handling schemes of the management. Those institutions should be in
the focus of the attention of regulators where the legal and organizational structure
is considerably different, or non-regulated fields are present with a high degree of
activity. The form of intervention of regulators might be the elimination and liqui-
dation of illegal transactions, but it can make use of moral suasion too, if it does
not have enough financial resources to reveal the transaction in detail. Regarding
the regulation of intra-group transactions, the Joint Forum formulated the follow-
ing principles:
1. Regulators have to reach ensure – directly of through the regulated members –
that conglomerates should dispose of appropriate risk management instru-
ments to manage group-wide intra-group transactions. In order to achieve this
regulators may take several steps, which they can enforce occasionally with the
help of supervisory limits.
2. Regulators have to follow intra-group transactions systematically through
reports and other measures in order to have a clear picture of the exposure of
conglomerates.
3. Regulators have to contribute to the disclosure of risk concentration.41
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4. Regulators (acting in different sectors or countries) should cooperate in order to
get a clear picture of individual conglomerates and so they could intervene in a
coordinated way if necessary.
5. Regulators have to implement necessary intervention efficiently and in a prop-
er way, if they consider that these are justified regarding the regulated members
or the group as a whole. 
3.4.1.2.3. Prudential regulation 
From among challenges created by financial conglomerates, the calculation and reg-
ulation of capital adequacy seems to be the most important one – partly due to
methodology and importance. From the point of view of conglomerates’ prudent
activity it is of fundamental importance that institutions can show an adequate quan-
tity of capital as coverage for the incidental occurrence of damaging events. The
Joint Forum elaborated its approach in this sense, according to which rules in indi-
vidual sectors are not to be replaced but to be put on a common basis. Techniques
to be elaborated to measure capital adequacy have to satisfy the following criteria:
1. They have to identify double or multiply gearing.
2. They have to disclose and manage transactions which result in excessive lever-
age by identifying certain loans as capital.
3. They must be able to manage situations with excessive leverage where the dou-
ble or multiply leverage is realized through non-regulated holding companies,
which have members pursuing financial activities.
4. They have to have solutions for managing risks which originate from non-regu-
lated members of the group, which perform activities similar to that pursued by
regulated members (i.e. factoring, leasing, reinsurance).
5. They have to touch upon the problem of handling investments into regulated
members, and they have to care for the prudent management of minority and
majority rights.3.4.2. Structure of regulation set up by the European Union
The basis of the stability of the European financial system is the equality and
mutual recognition of supervisions. This is accomplished by the principle of
home-country control, which is a guideline for the definition of the organization
responsible for the prudential supervision of financial service providers operating
in several countries. Part of the common framework involves directives with com-
pulsory force, which are accepted and inaugurated by the Ecofin meeting, con-
sisting of financial ministers of the EU with the help of international professional
organizations. Subsequently, the harmonization and acceptance of directives in the
individual countries is the responsibility of finance ministers. Thus, the national
authorities do have some room for manoeuvre to highlight the differences in inter-
pretation of directives in their own legislation. This, however, offers the possibility
for market players to make use of the regulatory arbitrage due to differences, while
it may hurt the conditions of the emergence of real competition.
Several types of framework systems and agreements serve the practical develop-
ment of the consolidated and comprehensive supervision system. From among
these, the most important ones are the bilateral agreements between national
supervisions (Memoranda of Understanding), which are required by the stipula-
tions on the principle of home-country control and on the consolidated supervi-
sion.
18 However, these agreements are elaborated in the most detailed way in the
case of institutions supervising the banking sector.
To support the cooperation and exchange of information of supervisory authorities
between each other and central banks several forums have been established, for
the time being only in a sectoral breakdown. The forum of professionals of bank-
ing regulation for discussing the position of individual institutions and scope of
problems is the Groupe de Contact. The Banking Supervision Committee was
established to support the ESCB in decision-making, which aims at the stability of
the banking and financial system – first of all problems of the payment systems and
liquidity crises. Obviously, this organization is also contributing to the internation-
al trade of information and cooperation. The exchange of information of the insur-
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18 However, there are also agreements with organizations outside the compulsory scope and with organ-
izations outside the EU, for example with the US FED and the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, and the supervisory authorities of Canada and Switzerland.ance supervisions is made within the framework of the Conference of Insurance
Supervision Authorities of the Member States of the European Union, briefly the
Conference. Conciliation forums of securities supervisions are the European
Securities Committee and the Committee of European Securities Regulators
(CESR). 
The European Commission aimed at the development and regulation of the unified
European financial market when the Financial Services Action Plan was formulat-
ed. On the basis of the Action Plan the Financial Services Policy Group was set up
in 1999, with the responsibility of defining the priorities of cross-sector regulation.
The Mixed Technical Group on the Prudential Supervision of Financial
Conglomerates (MTG) was created especially to prepare the regulation of con-
glomerates, which, following the acceptance of the related directive, became the
forum of further cross-sector technical conciliation. A wide range of institutions
took part in the outlining of the directive, among them the Banking Advisory
Committee, Insurance Committee and High Level Securities Supervisors
Committee, with the representation of finance ministers, national supervisory
authorities and central banks.
For the principles, structure and organization of regulating financial groups in the
European Union and the planned directive on the supplementary supervision of
financial conglomerates see chapter 4. 
3.4.2.1. The new supervisory framework of FSA
The British integrated financial supervisory authority, the Financial Services
Authority (FSA), responding to the new tendencies in the financial markets and,
with special attention to the high level protection of clients and markets and the
complexity and costs of reporting obligations, elaborated a new type of supervi-
sory framework. The regulatory structure created with the active cooperation of
market actors was presented to the professional community in 2001. The planned
date of inauguration of the final version is 1 January 2004.
The most important innovation of the framework is that instead of investigating
institutions in the usual way, on a sectoral basis, they will supervise them on a risk
basis. Thus the representatives of different sectors will be rated on identical prin-
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group level risk will also be specially highlighted. The same integrated approach
appears in the prescriptions regarding the measurement of risks, the methods of
risk management and the calculation of the available amount of capital.
19
The other dimension in the categorization of individual institutions is the potential
loss in client’s assets due to possible failures, and the extent of loss in market con-
fidence. The three categories of institutions separated on this basis – abandoning the
sectoral approach again – are broken down by the risk exposure of clients’ assets. 
In the course of the elaboration of supervisory principles, relevant EU directives in
force in June 2001 and the recommendations of international professional organ-
izations were taken as a basis. Nevertheless, the expectations formulated in these
principles were exceeded several times. This happened in cases where the mini-
mum requirements formulated were not sufficient to accomplish supervisory goals. 
In  the field of consolidated supervision the following additional expectations
emerged:
– Consolidated supervision should cover all types of investment companies
– Expectations of group level supervision should include financial conglomerates. 
The FSA considered the prudential regulation both of homogenous (inter-sectoral)
and heterogeneous (relating several sectors) groups. It plans to introduce a unified,
consolidated capital adequacy method inspiring efficient capital allocation for the
homogenous groups. In this sense intra-group transactions and capital allocations
will be exempted from the capital adequacy calculation applying to the group as a
whole. As an innovation, in order to facilitate consolidation proxy prescriptions will
be introduced for the non-regulated group members.
In the regulation of heterogeneous groups the anomaly in the EU directives, effec-
tive in 2001, was bridged over, namely, in the regulation of insurance companies
neither banks, nor investment companies were recognized as financial institutions
and vice-versa. Thus, according to the rules of the FSA, if any representatives of
the above-mentioned three sectors form a group, they are subject to a unified cal-
culation method of aggregating and capital requirement. Thus the dangers of a
double gearing and excessive leverage in holdings operating in more than one sec-
tor is avoided. The calculation of the group-level capital requirement is made by
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19 Nevertheless, cross-sector conciliation still does not turn up in the capital adequacy regulations.summarizing individual capital requirements of the group members, taking into
consideration the values of cross-ownership. Excessive capital over and above the
capital elements mutually accepted will be available for group-members with cap-
ital shortage. With this, regulators hope that a real picture will evolve regarding the
capital position on the group level, while at the same time acknowledging the indi-
vidual members’ capital adequacy.
3.4.3. Response of the US regulators to the challenge of financial
convergence
The oldest and most often cited act impeding convergence of financial institutions
is the Glass-Steagall Act approved by the US House of Representatives. This act
was inaugurated in 1933 as a response to the mass bank failures due to the Great
Depression. The act separated commercial and investment banking functions,
because in the opinion of the legislators commercial banks exposed the money of
investors to an excessive risk, underwriting bond or equity issues of their corporate
clients. Similar barriers were established against the fusion of investment banking
and insurance activities into one single organization. Moreover, geographical bar-
riers also hindered the expansion of financial institutions.
The need to satisfy innovation and clients’ claims as far as possible inspired finan-
cial institutions – formally obeying legal rules, but in contrary to their spirit – in par-
allel with expanding their scope of activities, to provide simultaneously banking,
investment and insurance services. Banks from the 1980s started to establish sub-
sidiaries, which, although not as a primary activity, underwrote and traded securi-
ties. Banks were allowed to sell insurance products, too, but only in communities
with less than 5000 inhabitants. With the merger of Citibank and Travelers Group,
however, a worldwide conglomerate was set up in 1998 operating primarily in the
banking and insurance sector, with the approval of the supervisory authorities.
Investment banks and insurers also found a way to sell deposit products. They
established tight contacts and common products with specialized credit institu-
tions, i.e. with credit card banks or industrial loan banks. Eventually, as a result of
efficient lobbying, not only brokerages and insurers, but also even non-financial
institutions were allowed to purchase a thrift.
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the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999. This act authorised activities, like insur-
ance, portfolio management, underwriting and commercial banking, separate
activities until then, within one organization. Provision of the whole spectrum of
financial activities, however, is the privilege of one type of strictly limited institu-
tion, the so-called financial holding company (FHC), which can function only with
the certificate of the Federal Reserve. They have to have an appropriate amount of
capital, risk management and credit rating. The above-mentioned strict condi-
tions, however, relate not only to the holding as a whole, but also to individual sub-
sidiaries performing special functions. In order to evade excessive risks being shift-
ed to banks operating in the framework of the holding, limits were also established
regarding the transactions between the banks and other subsidiaries of the hold-
ing.
The range of activities of a financial “nature” to be executed by the FHCs was
announced by the Ministry of Finance and the FED in a predefined way, in the form
of a list. Holding companies may execute these activities without prior approval,
via ex-post announcement. In addition, they may perform auxiliary financial serv-
ices and other activities, assuming the FED has licensed them, and which do not
involve an additional risk to the financial system.
Regarding cross-sector activities, banks’ financial subsidiaries have a more
restricted room for manoeuvre. Besides insurance and investment banking activi-
ties, banks’ subsidiaries are barred from insurance portfolio investments, real
estate investments and investment developments. The operation of these sub-
sidiaries was separated by the measure that also considerably limited their intra-
group activities, with special respect to risks transferred to banks. The purpose of
this measure is to protect the deposit insurance fund from risks arising elsewhere.
The act also limited the volume of financial activities performed via banks’ sub-
sidiaries; the aggregated balance sheet of subsidiaries may not exceed either 45
per cent of the total assets of the parent bank or USD 50 billion. In addition, the
right to acquire one thrift was eliminated.
The act arranged the supervision of financial institutions on a functional basis.
Practically, the right of regulation remains with the supervisory authorities of the
individual sectors, i.e. the Federal Reserve, Securities and Exchange Commission
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The umbrella supervision of the financial holding companies, however, is made
by the Federal Reserve. In the course of this work it uses information of the func-
tional authorities, and it has an exclusive role in the protection of banks operating
in the framework of holdings. Functional regulation, however, extends not only to
financial holdings, but also to the activities of banks. Thus, security trading and
investment service activities are supervised by SEC, insurance activities
20 by state
insurance authorities.
The act also provides for the protection of non-public client data. Accordingly, the
financial institution has to inform the client when entering in contact – and subse-
quently at least once a year – on its data protection policy and its practice. On
handing over non-public data of clients the act only says that, according to the
decision of the client, data are not to be handed over to third parties outside the
holding; thus members of the group might have free access to them. 
3.4.4. The Australian practice of regulating financial 
conglomerates
In March 1999, the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) published
for the first time a pamphlet about the newly elaborated principles of the supervi-
sion of financial conglomerates. This was followed by several more detailed publi-
cations, including the reproduction of responses from the financial sector. In the
course of regulation the aim of the supervisory authority was to create a proper
equilibrium between the costs and benefits of planned regulations. The pamphlet
on the capital requirement and large exposure of conglomerates – the last in the
series – was published in October 2001, followed by a consultation with the sector.
Guidelines might turn into prudential standards in 2002, which will be followed by
a three-year grace period. The final regulatory structure will be introduced in par-
allel with the inauguration of the new Basle capital adequacy requirements. This
will help make use of the fact that, in accepting the recommendations, the
Australian national regulation – by virtue of its own authority – has to establish
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20 This includes insurance products licensed by OCC only. Banks and their subsidiaries may usually not
trade in title insurance or in some states they can acquire licences, but only for brokering.rules only with a supplementary character, in subjects that are not regulated in
detail by the Basle recommendations. 
The basis of the regulation of financial conglomerates is that they are either man-
aged by a credit institution,
21, or a holding company is on the top of a group,
which includes a credit institution.
22 Members of the group may be those per-
forming financial and non-financial activities, and regulated or not regulated by
the APRA. Nevertheless, the scope of activity of the group members must be
clear, transparent and well documented. The regulating authority defines the
holding’s scope of activity, the possible ways of ownership structure within the
holding and it sets up criteria regarding the composition of the managing bodies
of the holding and its credit institution members. The aim of the criteria is to
ensure transparency of the interest system and to avoid conflicts of interest. The
members of the management have to satisfy the qualification standards set by
the conglomerate, which include, beyond professionalism and professional expe-
rience, reputation.
Regulatory guidelines emphasize the clear, comprehensive and regular disclosure
of group-wide and individual risks of the credit institution. The organizational
structure and scope of operation of the conglomerate should be transparent
enough for the regulatory authority to oversee the risk profile. The CEO of the con-
glomerate has to declare to the APRA each year that the group has a proper risk-
disclosure and risk management policy and practice. Moreover, the credit institu-
tion within the group has to be liquid and well funded in relation to the require-
ments, and its transactions concluded with partner institutions should satisfy strict
criteria. Special stipulations are given for services provided via cross selling, in the
case of which the real provider has to be indicated. The reason for this is that bank-
ing and non-banking products should be differentiated for clients, because of the
differences in the safety guarantees. 
The APRA aims to supervise financial conglomerates on consolidated basis and
credit institutions individually as well. Accordingly, it elaborated a three level
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21 In the Australian terminology, Authorized Deposit-taking Institution. Authors regard them as credit
institutions.
22 The regulatory authority plans to expand the framework in the future to the conglomerates dominat-
ed by insurers. Regarding principles (excluding necessary differentiation) the system featuring here
will be used there, too. (APRA 2001)evaluation system consisting of credit institutions,
23 credit institution groups and
the conglomerate as a whole. Each level has its specific capital adequacy require-
ment, which is stricter than earlier.
24 In the first two levels the 8 per cent capital
adequacy requirement is general. On the level of credit institutions and sub-
sidiaries connected in the case of acquisitions, the APRA requires a total deduc-
tion from the tier 1 capital – except for small volume portfolio investments – in
order to avoid double gearing. On the level of credit institution groups, invest-
ments into non-consolidated subsidiaries and other credit institutions are also to
be covered with tier 1 capital. On the third level – only for the entities indicated
by the APRA – a capital adequacy in line with the risk profile of the conglomerate
has to be presented. If the APRA is not satisfied with the internal identification of
risk, it can prescribe additional capital requirement for the most vulnerable mem-
ber, the credit institution.
The newly established large exposure limit system also includes prescriptions for
intra-group transactions and for external partners. From among intra-group
exposures, the highest limit is set for other, intra-group credit institutions, at 50 per
cent of the primary capital, and it may be less only in the case of other members
under prudential regulations (25 per cent) and other group members (15 per cent).
Total intra-group exposure may not exceed 35 per cent of the credit institution’s




23 On the first level credit institutions are dealt with together with their subsidiaries connecting to them
functionally, and they are nominated in the document as Extended Licensed Entities.
24 Consolidated capital adequacy requirements go beyond the Basle capital adequacy recommenda-
tions in the respect that there is a call for consolidated capital requirement for groups, which is not
dealt with in the recommendations (i.e. groups performing considerable insurance or trading activi-
ties).4. Regulation of financial groups in the EU
Financial sectors convergence became a general tendency in the nineties, in par-
allel with the globalisation trend characterizing the financial market as a whole.
Concentration processes and M&A transactions, which involved most industries,
also affected the financial sector as of the end of the eighties. Whereas in the eight-
ies and early nineties the merger and acquisition of homogeneous institutions (i.e.
those performing similar activities) took place, in the nineties the establishment of
universal banks and financial groups accelerated.
25 Institutions pursuing different
financial activities formed conglomerates through M&As or through a company
setting up in another financial sector. 
The different financial sectors might be defined by activities or types of institutions
authorized to perform those activities. These two different definitions do not nec-
essarily result in similar categories, since if we consider, for example, the securi-
ties market traditionally as one sector, this includes not only investment compa-
nies, but universal credit institutions, institutional investors and the infrastructure
and marketplace (stock exchange and clearing houses). From the point of view of
regulating financial groups and conglomerates, in order to review the relevant
guidelines of the EU we defined different financial sectors according to their char-
acteristic activities. Thus, there is the banking sector, defined on the basis of
deposit collection and lending activity by directive 2000/12/EC, the investment
services sector, defined by directive 93/22/EEC, and the insurance sector in the
case of institutions performing insurance activities (life: 79/267/EEC; non-life:
73/239/EEC, 92/49/EEC). Certain types of institutions may belong to more than
one sector simultaneously. One of the most well known examples is the universal
credit institution, which pursues activity simultaneously in two sectors: besides col-
lecting deposits it may engage in the whole spectrum of investment services activ-
ity. The investment services sector includes - along with universal credit institutes




25 A further important feature of the merger and acquisition activity in the EU financial market is that
transactions were made almost without exception among companies with their headquarters in the
same country, or they were oriented into developing countries outside the EU. Cross-border M&As
were quite rare. The big market failures discussed earlier (BCCI and Barings) clearly indicated that
the investigation of one single institution is not sufficient to evaluate its stability and
its financial position if there is an organizational or interest relation between the
institution supervised and another institution or private individual which results in
dependence between them. The supervision of groups built upon dependence
requires different supervision elements and different emphases than those in the
case of individual institutions. Due to their size, however, these groups are the most
significant, dominant players; thus their increasing expansion in itself calls for the
attention of regulators. The risk of contagion within one organization means con-
tagion among different financial markets (banks, investment firms, insurance
undertakings), thus their efficient regulation and supervision is of fundamental
importance from the point of view of financial stability. Simultaneously, the emer-
gence of market problems and their consequences requires prompt intervention.
Group level supervision is reasonable in the case of any regulated financial service
provider, independent of what institution or person it depends on. Group-wide
supervision of institutions, however, requires different methods and rules, depend-
ing on whether 
– they operate in the same financial sector and the same legal rules apply to them
(homogeneous groups),
– they are active in different financial sectors (financial conglomerates),
– the majority of the members operate outside the financial sector (conglomerate
with mixed activities).
Special risks characteristic for groups can be divided into two categories. On the
one hand, the capital and debt of the parent company might be used more than
one time, which means only the formal fulfilment of capital adequacy require-
ments and under-coverage of unexpected risks on the individual level. The other
risk factor arising from ownership relations is dependence, since in the case of
problems of the owned institution the owner has to step in, which influences the
financial situation of the owner. Dependence will be further strengthened by intra-
group transactions, which may influence risk exposure of institutions. They often
make it non-transparent, and often they take steps to use the possibility of arbi-
trage offered by differences in regulation, or they even harm the interests of
investors. Group-wide validation of risk limits and capital requirements prevents
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vidual requirements, it acknowledges the special relationship among institu-
tions, when exempting intra-group risk exposures from fulfilling limits and
adjusted capital deductions.
EU regulation of the consolidated supervision of financial entities had taken shape
by the nineties. First it was concluded in the banking sector through the directive
92/30/EEC. This was followed by directive 93/6/EEC regarding the consolidated
supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, and in 1998 the regulation
concerning insurance groups was completed. Rules concerning consolidated
supervision can be divided into two groups:
– the disclosure obligation of group members and cooperation between the com-
petent supervisory authorities, and
– group-wide prudential rules (i.e. limits on investments, large exposures and cap-
ital requirements).
EU directives regulate consolidated supervision related institutions according their
scope. If there is an institution in the group, which belongs to the scope of a differ-
ent directive or is a non-regulated institution, then consolidated supervision is exe-
cuted by disclosure obligation or supervisory cooperation. Group-wide prudential
rules are prescribed only in the case of institutions with similar activity.
The big failures mentioned earlier called attention to inadequacies in the regula-
tion of financial groups. Examples selected referred to general but corrigible fail-
ures in the regulation. These problems were a consequence of the segregation of
national regulations and national supervisions and not of sectoral regulation. The
failure of BCCI generated a very sharp reaction on the side of regulators, result-
ing in the elaboration of a new directive as a first step.
26 The case of BCCI called
attention first of all to the fact that regarding exclusively capital connections
(shareholder or member participations) is not sufficient to disclose all the depend-
ency contacts of the institutions supervised. The new directive modified the terms
of authorisation and operational licences, the cooperation of supervisions and
other authorities
27 supporting the stability of financial institutions in a way that
authorization for groups aiming at regulation arbitrage and incomplete superviso-
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26 95/26/EC, the so-called Post-BCCI Directive
27 Court of registration, competition authority, central bank, auditors, professionals providing independ-
ent supervision.ry surveillance should not be granted at all. The directive stipulates a much wider
scope of cooperation among supervisors and authorities than earlier, while elimi-
nating restrictions - first of all in the field of data protection - hindering informa-
tion disclosure, and it introduces the reporting obligation of auditors and other
independent professionals.
The post-BCCI directive, however, did not touch upon consolidation rules in force.
Sectoral regulation did not allow group-wide prudential requirements to be related
to the group of institutions in other financial sectors, and some insufficiencies and
inconsistencies from the sectoral regulation survived (i.e. different requirements
relating to the same activity). On the financial markets of the EU, however, finan-
cial conglomerates expanded at an increasing rate, being simultaneously active in
several financial sectors, and thus their regulation is not obvious or it is deficient.
The presence of these financial actors requires that group-wide capital require-
ments and risk limits should relate to them just as much as to their colleagues act-
ing in one and the same financial sector. Thus, a new directive was elaborated on
the supervision of financial conglomerates, which was based first of all on the rec-
ommendations of the Joint Forum presented earlier. The debate in the parliament
is underway at the time of writing this study (Q2 2002).
4.1. EU legislation of financial groups and conglomerates in force
prior to and following the failure of BCCI
28
Rules relating to financial groups and conglomerates can be broken down into
three categories:
1. Conditions of the authorization licences of supervised institutions and rules of
certain sectoral directives stipulating exclusive or main activities ab ovo deter-
mine the organizational structure of groups and their participation in each other.
2.  The second field to be investigated is the set of prudential rules of groups
already existing (i.e. limits on investments and risk exposures, capital require-
ments). These are also indicated by sectoral directives.




28 Regulation in force is based on the rules accepted until May 2002.We follow this structure in overviewing rules entering into force in the EU in the
period 1970-90 and still effective. Directives of different financial sectors regarding
supervision of financial groups were modified for the first time by the 95/26/EC,
so-called post-BCCI directive. This directive represented the first attempt to elimi-
nate the most striking insufficiencies in all the directives regulating financial sector
entities arising from sectoral regulations by amending them and simultaneously
introducing unified rules and definitions regarding authorization and supervisory
cooperation (points 1 and 3).
4.1.1. Rules effecting the organization of financial groups
Strict legal rules regarding acquisition limits, reporting obligations and exclusive
activities originate from the regulated nature of the financial market. In the case of
non-regulated market participants, the authorities do not have as much leeway to
intervene in the organizational structure of company groups as in the case of reg-
ulated financial players.
4.1.1.1. Specialization principles
According the EU rules there are specialization principles regarding certain sectors.
Thus, exclusively those institutions may perform deposit collecting, insurance and
UCITS fund management activities, which are entitled by law to do so.
Consequently, organizations which provide these services simultaneously, may
never be established by fusions, only through merger or acquisition via a holding
company and by setting up, i.e. by connecting separate legal entities. This con-
necting may take the following forms, of which the last two involve the creation of
a conglomerate (for example in the case of a bank and an insurer):
– By concluding a cooperation agreement among existing institutions (i.e. a bank
sells insurance products under the name of the insurer);
– By setting up a joint venture (this is a more formal cooperation, i.e. the bank sells
insurance products through its own retail network under the name of the bank);
– A bank setting up an insurer subsidiary (and they use a common distribution net-
work);
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sidiary.
Despite the fact that according to the legal rules a legal fusion cannot take place,
a level of economic fusion is mostly achieved in the case of conglomerates with
merging tasks or managerial responsibilities.
4.1.1.2. Veto of the supervisory authority
The supervisory authority has the right to veto certain ownership connections of
supervised institutions. The acquisition of a certain proportion of ownership or
votes (10%, then 20%, 33% and 50 %) should be reported to the supervisory
authority. The authority might refuse to issue a licence if the owner is inadequate,
or if it cannot be taken for granted that the institution will be managed in a reliable
and prudent manner. The reporting obligation to the supervisors sets the frame-
work of the consolidated supervision, since the foundation and operation of the
institution will depend on its ownership and group structure. This means that
already at the start of the institution’s activities and from that point on it will be
monitored continuously in terms of whom the supervised institution is depending
on, who is the person or institution that is able to influence its activity. This is, how-
ever, basically constrained by the fact that the possibility of exercising influence is
made dependent exclusively on ownership and voting rights. A much wider possi-
bility of having influence was represented by BCCI, when it was able to influence
an institution exclusively through investment consulting.
4.1.2. Consolidation and regulation of homogeneous groups
4.1.2.1. Scope of the consolidated supervision
Institutions, which already obtained their authorization form one group, belong
under a consolidated supervision if they exert a dominating influence upon anoth-
er institution or they might be influenced by another institution. Thus, with the
criterion of forming groups, the measure of mutual dependence is the extent of
influence. Dominating influence might be exerted not only in cases stipulated by
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29 which are easily circumvented due to cases constrained to own-
ership or membership rights, but the opinion of the supervisory authorities on its
own is enough to force institutions to adopt consolidated rules. The opinion of the
supervisory authorities will be determinant first of all in cases without participation
or membership contacts, however the institution has to be influenced dominantly.
Dominant influence happens by being managed with another institution on a uni-
fied basis, or if the majority of their managing boards are common, or it is influ-
enced significantly by any other means. This implies a quite substantial power of
discrimination for the supervision and it facilitates appropriate action in respect of
actually existing relations.
The first level of consolidated supervision concerns the possibility for supervisors
to have access to information, which  involves the widest sphere of financial
groups, since irrespective of their activity and sector any institution might belong
to this category, that is in a parent-subsidiary or participation relationship with the
institution supervised. The parent-subsidiary relationship is stipulated in the
accounting rules on the one hand, and is determined by the opinion of the super-
visory authority about the existence of dominating influence on the other. In the
banking and investment service sectors participation means a voting right or own-
ership proportion of at least 20 per cent. In the insurance sector, however, the
durable contact stipulated in the directive on accountancy
30 is regarded as a par-
ticipation too, i.e. even in the case of a participation below 20 per cent. 
The second level concerns the consolidated reporting obligation, the group-wide
capital adequacy and the regulation of large exposures. These are the require-
ments which are able to manage risks featuring groups. These requirements are
also regulated by sectoral directives and the scope of consolidation is determined
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29 Financial directives used the narrower definition of the directive on accountancy No. 7 (83/349/EEC)
on parent companies under consolidated supervision. Accordingly, a company (parent company)
belongs under consolidated supervision, if in an other company
– it has a voting majority,
– it is able to nominate or dismiss the majority of leaders and at the same time is a shareholder or
member of the company,
– it has a dominating influence by statute or contract, and at the same time is a shareholder or mem-
ber of the company,
– the majority of leaders was nominated by its vote (and there is no other parent company which sat-
isfies the first 3 points), and at the same time is a shareholder or member of the company,
– it is the sole leader by voting rights acquired through commission or contract and at the same time
is a shareholder or member of the company.
30 Accountancy Directive No. 4 (78/660/EEC) art. 17by the dominating influence among the institutions under the authority of the
directive concerned. This means that in the banking sector, for example, credit
institutions and financial institutions have to satisfy prudential requirements on an
group-wide level, while with insurance undertakings belonging to them this is not
necessary.
As an essential element, the scope of consolidation in accounting is not identi-
cal with the scope of prudential consolidation due to the fundamentally different
targets of consolidation. The primary target of the accountancy report is to pres-
ent the financial position of the group, whereas the target of prudential consolida-
tion is to find out to what extent the financial situation (risks) of the supervised
institution is influenced by its position in the group and the risky character of
other group members.
4.1.2.1.1. Sectoral directives
Requirements and rules of consolidation stipulated in bank directive 200/12/EC
31
relate to group members consisting of financial holding companies, holding com-
panies with mixed activity, credit institutions and financial institutions.
Consolidated supervision of credit institutions relates to any groups which incor-




31 Directive 2000/12/EC consolidates legal rules concerning credit institutions existing already earlier,
thus Directives 77/780/EEC, 89/646/EEC first and second, Directive 89/299/EEC on the calculation
of adjusted capital, Directive 92/30/EEC on consolidated supervision, Directive 92/121/EEC on large
exposures and Directive 96/10/EEC on netting.Directive 2000/12 stipulates consolidated supervision for the following scope of
institutions.
The consolidated reporting obligation concerns institutions highlighted in grey;
insurance companies and mixed activity holding companies linked to credit insti-
tutions are required only to cooperate with the supervisory authorities and to sup-
ply information. Cooperation between the supervisory authorities is carried out if
the institutions supervised separately belong to the same group, i.e. in the case
where the credit institution is in the same group with an insurer or investment firm
acting in another state or in a third country. The obligation to supply information
empowers the supervision to ask for information directly from not supervised insti-
tutions if controlled by a credit institution or financial holding company or via the
controlling credit institution or financial institution, which is important for fulfilling
supervisory functions and for monitoring the validity of information. The same
applies to the mixed activity holding company, where information is relevant from



























Figure 2Consequences of the different definition of financial institutions
Due to the different philosophy of the Hungarian and EU regulation it is
worth clarifying how the concept of financial institution, financial holding
company and mixed activity holding company is to be identified. In line with
the EU regulation a financial institution is a non-credit institution undertak-
ing with the main activity of acquiring participations or executing universal
banking activities listed in Annex 1 of Directive 2000/12 with the exception
of collecting deposits (i.e. according to the Hungarian terminology it is enti-
tled to provide all financial and investment services excluding collecting
deposits). One of the purposes of defining the concept of the financial institu-
tion is to ensure consolidated supervision on the basis of activity. If the insti-
tutions specified for the abovementioned activities form a common group
with the credit institution, group level regulations (large exposure, capital
adequacy, supervision) relate to them. In the case of the banking directive
this means to credit institutions, financial institutions and to institutions
providing supplementary banking services, thus these institutions are to be
handled as one single institution from the point of view of taking risks. 
Financial holding company is a financial institution, among the subsidiaries
of which there are mainly or exclusively credit institutions and financial insti-
tutions, but at least one credit institution. While a mixed activity holding com-
pany is a parent institution, which is not a credit institution or financial hold-
ing company but there is at least one credit institution among its subsidiaries.
Thus all non-credit institutions or non financial institutions (for example an
insurance undertaking) might be a mixed activity holding company, if it
owns a credit institution subsidiary.
In line with the Hungarian regulation a financial institution is the credit
institution and the financial undertaking (executing certain activities from
Annex 1 2000/12/EC), thus it includes different sphere of institutions and dif-
ferent activities compared to the financial institution defined by the EU on the
basis of activities. Financial holding company is a financial undertaking, the
exclusive activity of which is the ownership of financial institutions or invest-
ment firms, from among of which at least one is a credit institution.
Exclusiveness like that is not prescribed in the EU rules. Directive
2000/12/EC requires only that subsidiaries of the financial holding company
consist mainly of credit institutions and financial institutions, from among
them at least one should be a credit institution, and 93/6/EEC supplements
the definition of a holding company with the ownership of investment firms.
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tutions and investment firms are competitors on the market of investment servic-
es. Thus, in order to offer equal treatment it stipulates prudential requirements for
investment undertakings identical with that of credit institutions, and it introduces
the consolidated supervision of investment firms.
Scope of consolidated institution of Directive 93/6/EC.
Institutions highlighted prepare consolidated reports on consolidated limits and
the capital requirement relating to them. The definition of financial holding com-
pany and mixed activity holding company will be applied, besides credit institu-
tions, to investment firms. Thus, a financial holding company involves financial
institutions the subsidiaries of which comprise mainly or exclusively credit institu-
tions, investment firms and financial institutions, or at least one credit institution or
investment firm. The same is true for a mixed activity holding company, which
means a controlling institution, which is neither an investment undertaking, nor a
financial holding company, but there is at least one investment firm or credit insti-
tution among its subsidiaries.
Directive 98/78/EC regulates insurance groups. The range of institutions covered




























The insurance holding company is a parent institution, whose primary activity is to
acquire participations exclusively or mainly in insurance and reinsurance under-
takings and in insurance undertakings of third countries, and from among sub-
sidiaries at least one insurance undertaking. The mixed activity insurance holding
company is a parent institution, which is not an insurance, reinsurance or insur-
ance undertaking of a third country or an insurance holding company, but there is
at least one insurance undertaking among its subsidiaries. The consolidation
requirement in the case of insurance undertakings concerns a wider range of insti-
tutions, since the participation relationship relates not only to 20 per cent of voting
or ownership proportion, but to any durable relation which represents an ownership
right below 20 per cent, but influences the operation of the company.
In the case of mixed activity groups consolidated supervision involves, besides
rights of collecting information and cooperation, supervision of intra-group trans-
actions. The supervision of intra-group transactions will be executed in such a way
that each undertaking, which is at least in a participation relationship with the
insurance undertaking or with an undertaking in a participation relationship with
the insurance undertaking, and private individuals who enjoy participation in any































year. These transactions are mostly loans extended to each other, guarantees, off-
balance sheet items transacted among each other, investments and transactions
relating to adjusted capital elements and agreements regarding the division of cap-
ital – but they do not have to satisfy consolidated capital adequacy requirements.
Due to the definitions of sectoral directives there are also overlaps. Thus, a mixed
activity insurance holding company might be a mixed activity holding company
according to the banking directive, but it is also possible that the mixed activity
insurance holding company is at the same time a financial holding company in the
sense of the banking directive, or the mixed activity holding company in the bank-
ing directive sense is an insurance holding company according to the insurance
directive.
4.1.2.2. Prudential rules of financial groups
4.1.2.2.1. Capital adequacy requirements
The primary consideration behind the creation of group-wide capital requirements
was the prevention of multiple capital gearing. Participation of the parent compa-
ny in the subsidiary might involve investment of the parent company’s own capi-
tal, which, however, is a capital element from the point of view of the subsidiary.
Thus, in the course of individual capital calculation, both institutions regard the
same capital as a capital element (double gearing), and in a longer ownership
chain this might happen several times (multiple gearing). Group-wide require-
ments sort out these aggregations with the help of one of the recommended meth-
ods, so it will turn out if members of the group fulfil capital requirements on their
own, but not as a group. 
In defining group-wide capital, the capital of the subsidiary is not to be taken into
consideration either, when it originates from the borrowing of the parent compa-
ny (excessive leverage). This loan is to be refunded by the parent company a cer-
tain time, so the requirement raised against any capital element, namely, that it
should be available at any time to cover unexpected losses, will not be met. Thus,
every source the participation of the parent company may generate cannot be
taken into consideration in the capital calculation of the subsidiary.63
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There are three methods of defining the consolidated capital, which all have the
same result (capital value). Only their starting points are different, depending on
whether consolidated balance sheet data or individual data are available. The pur-
pose of all of these methods is to define actually available capital elements by
sorting out multiple gearing, which in the course of the investigation of capital
adequacy is to be compared with aggregated capital requirements. The informa-
tion on group-wide capital is important not only because of the investigation of
capital adequacy. The majority of risk limits of the group as a whole, with the
exception of insurance undertakings,
32 might be stated in proportion to the reg-
ulatory capital. Thus it is really important that all three methods have the same
result. These methods are summarized in Table 2. As is apparent, the methodolo-
gy used by the Joint Forum and EU Directives is substantially similar, only the
denominations are different. (See table 2) 
The “method of building block approach” or “accounting consolidation based
approach” builds on a traditional accounting consolidation, where data of consoli-
dated balance sheet and profit and loss account after sorting out transactions,
exposures among each other provide information about the financial status and
results of the group as a whole. In certain cases, however, the consolidated
accountancy reports are not adequate for the purposes of prudential consolidation.
This could happen because the information concerning from which group member
a related asset or liability originated may get lost. Consolidation of institutions with
completely different balance structures would provide a misleading and distorted
picture. The consolidated balance sheet of a bank and an institution acting in a dif-
ferent sector, i.e. an insurance undertaking or not supervised institution, is not
appropriate to clarify banking risks and to define banking limits based on balance
sheet requirements. The same is also true for the insurance risk, where the basic
risk is the uncertainty of the value of liabilities and the fluctuation of value of assets
behind them. Reserve and capital requirements of insurance undertakings were
defined with regard to these risks. Thus in these cases it is necessary that the risk
of some individual activities and the requirements in line with it should be separat-
ed from each other. The “building block method” enables this in such a way that it
divides the group into sectors according to regulation and activity, calculates the
32 The risk limits of insurers will be defined in relation to the technical reserves.64
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Method of building block approach 
Consolidated capital of the group must exceed the
aggregated amount of capital requirements of individ-
ual group blocks or blocks pursuing the same activity.
The consolidated capital of the group = consolidated
assets (excluding participations) – consolidated liabili-
ties (excluding liabilities among each other) + reserves
Joint Forum 1999 
Risk-based aggregation
From group capital defined through aggregating indi-
vidual capital elements the amount of group-wide par-
ticipation will be deducted and this has to exceed the
individual capital requirements’ aggregated amount. 
Risk-based deduction
The excess capital or capital deficit of the subsidiary
provides the value of the investment of the parent.
Thus, the individual, non-consolidated capital of the
parent will be recalculated in such a way that the book
value of participations will be deducted and, instead,
the excess capital or capital deficit of the subsidiary will
be taken into consideration. If the investment of the par-
ent exceeds the capital requirement of the subsidiary,
then the excess will be a part of the parent’s capital,
because it is also available to other members of the
group. If, however, there is a deficit, because the invest-
ment is less than the capital requirement adequate with
the participation of the parent, then the deficit should be
replaced by the parent. Thus it will be deducted from
capital elements available for the parent and the group.
The re-calculated capital of the parent should exceed
the capital requirement of the parent. 
Method based on accounting consolidation
Own fund of the group on accounting consolidation
basis has to exceed the aggregated amount of capital
required for each sector separately (only those ele-
ments are to be selected as capital element which are
mutually acknowledged by the sectoral rules). 
EU Directives 
Deduction and aggregation method
From the aggregated amount of individual capital ele-
ments, individual capital requirements and the book
value of participations will be deducted (elements to be
selected are only those which are mutually acknowl-
edged by the sectoral rules). 
Requirement deduction method
The capital of the parent company has to exceed the
capital requirement of the parent and the higher amount
from among the book value of participations and the
proportional part of the capital requirement of sub-
sidiaries. Based on the conservative principle, the
planned EU directive does not take into consideration
excess capital of the subsidiary, but it does the deficit
(see risk-based deduction). 
Table 2
Methods recommended for calculating capital adequacy
33
33 Illustrative examples can be found in the Annex.65
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capital requirement of the sector and by aggregating them it investigates if the con-
solidated capital of the group is sufficient or not.
There are cases when consolidated accountancy reports are not available, but
the supervisory authorities need the consolidation of the group member. In this
case use can be made of the methods “deduction and aggregation“ and
“requirement deduction”, which define the amount of the adjusted capital avail-
able for the group on the basis of individual data and which enable risk limits to
be stated. Also in this case the requirements of different sectors can be easily
met, since aggregation or deduction of individual capital elements or capital
requirements is made ex post. These methods prevent multiple gearing with-
out netting for exposures against each other. Thus, if there is no available con-
solidated financial report or the intra-group transactions are too complex (and
without this data important information would be lost), these methods might be
more useful.
4.1.2.2.2. Minority owners 
In the course of consolidation a new problem is represented by the treatment of
not 100% owned subsidiaries. There are pro and contra arguments for their full
consolidation, i.e. that they should be consolidated as if they were owned 100 per
cent. If there are minority owners, the full consolidation and pro-rata consolidation
of participation is differently conservative, depending on whether the group mem-
bers individually have a surplus or deficit.
34 As seen in Table 2, in the course of
consolidation the actually available capital of the group members will be defined,
deducting mutual ownership and participations at book value. If members individ-
ually have capital surplus, the result of the full consolidation is more favourable
than in the case of pro-rata consolidation. In that case the surplus of the minority
ownership is calculated among the available capital elements of the group, where-
as when deducting participation, only the participation of the parent will be deduct-
ed. If the subsidiary has a capital deficit the pro-rata consolidation gives the more
favourable result, since a full-scale settlement of the deficit would mean that the
substitution of the deficit is exclusively the responsibility of the parent or the group.
34 Illustrative example can be found in the Annex.In respect of a conservative point of view connected with minority ownership,
sectoral rules are different. During the calculation of capital adequacy of insur-
ance groups (98/78/EC) capital elements are to be taken into consideration
according to the proportion of participations, excluding the case of capital
deficit. In this latter case a full-scale consolidation should be performed, in order
that the deficit should be taken into consideration to its full extent during the
consolidation. In the case of credit institutions and investment firms Directive
2000/12/EC stipulates primarily full consolidation, consolidation according to
participations is possible only if responsibility is also limited according to par-
ticipation.
4.1.2.2.3. Intra-group transactions and risk concentrations 
Intra-group transactions on their own do not threaten the system, since even the
need for more efficient division of activities within the group, for focusing on the
core activity, results in the creation of groups and conglomerates. The responsibil-
ity of the regulators is to ensure that the transactions should not weaken the finan-
cial position of the group and should not endanger their maintenance. To this end,
there should be a clear picture of the flows and accumulation of risks even on the
level of groups, too. 
From the point of view of supervision there are two aspects which might be prob-
lematic: relations of mutual dependence as a result of intra-group transactions and
pricing of transactions among each other. Thus, during the supervision of intra-
group transaction, and similar to that of risk concentration, first of all the danger of
contagion within the group, possible interest conflicts, the risk of evading sec-
toral rules and the level and magnitude of risks is to be evaluated.
Intra-group transactions and risks on their own rarely cause permanent insolven-
cy, due to the mutual dependence within the group. However, liquidity or prof-
itability problems of individual members in general may temporarily concern to
other group members. Mutual dependence within the group and several forms of
different internal transactions often lead to the development of accumulating risks.
Table 3 summarizes which types of transactions may contribute to the develop-
ment and strengthening of different risks.
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ods and to quite a different extent. In the case of credit institutions and investment
firms limits are stipulated in relation to the amount of the regulatory capital. In the
case of individual institutions and homogenous groups consisting of credit institu-
tions and investment firms a large exposure is when it exceeds 10 per cent of reg-
ulatory capital and 25 per cent is the upper limit. The amount of aggregated large
exposures may not exceed 800 per cent of the regulatory capital. As a similarly
quantitative regulation, a credit institution may acquire participation only up to 15
per cent, on an aggregated level to 60 per cent of the capital, with the exemption
of other credit institutions, financial institutions and undertakings providing ancil-
lary banking services. Holding limits of credit institutions and investment compa-
nies do not relate to insurance undertakings and equities kept temporarily with the
purpose of avoiding losses. If, however, the credit institution exceeds holding lim-
its – which it cannot do in the case of large exposures – then it has to cover the
amount above the limit with 100 per cent capital. Insurance undertakings also
enjoy more favourable treatment in the case of large exposure limits of credit insti-
tutions and investment firms; in their case the 25 per cent limit becomes as high
as 40 per cent. 
EU regulations relating to the acquisition of investment firms is more liberalized
than in the case of credit institutions, namely the 15% and 60% limit will not be
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Types of risks Types of transactions 
Risk of intra-group contagion
Risk of interest conflicts
Risk of regulatory arbitrage
Intra-group trade (not necessarily at market prices)
Intra-group allocation of certain assets under special conditions (more favourable
taxation and market terms, presence of professionals)
Centralized liquidity management
Risk transfer through reinsurance or securitisation
Allocation of client claims or of liabilities among parts of the company (accord-
ing to the interest of the group and not of the client)
Intra-group extension of loans, assuming guarantee and commitments (pricing,
follow up of flow of assets might be problematic)
Table 3: Risks of intra-group transactions68
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applied. The large exposure limits, however, are valid with the same conditions for
them as well. 
In the case of insurance undertakings, according to the directives, asset spread
rules are used only for those assets which are to be regarded as an investment form
of the technical reserves. Thus, the investment limits are stipulated in the propor-
tion of the technical reserves.
35 Regarding investment of assets other than techni-
cal reserves member countries may not impose limitations. The fundamental
approach of investing technical reserves concerns safety, yield and marketability,
which is supported by diversification. Consequently, diversification rules signifi-
cantly contribute to the validation of the above-mentioned aspects. Risks connect-
ed with the investments of insurance undertakings are connected with individual
institutional levels, while on a group-wide level both technical reserves and invest-
ments are aggregated. Thus, if insurance undertakings fulfil their asset spread rules
on an individual level, they will be fulfilled automatically on a group-wide level,
too.
36 There are no concentration limits connected with commitments of the insur-
ance undertakings (insurance contracts). These risks are to be covered with other
instruments, such as reinsurance and mutual insurance. 
Due to diverging sectoral rules, banks and investment firms may easily evade large
exposure limits through insurance undertakings participating in the group but not
included in the consolidation. They are able to do this because in the case of insur-
ance undertakings the investment of assets other than technical reserves, thus,
own capital, is not limited at all, and also transactions not connected with techni-
cal reserves are not limited either.
4.1.3. Cooperation and information exchange of supervisory
authorities 
Although the exchange of information of supervisory bodies with other authorities
(supervisory organizations, liquidators, auditors) in order to perform their duties
35 For example, they might not invest more than 5% of their technical reserves into securities of one
issuer, more than 10 per cent in nearby buildings and land and OTC products, and they cannot hold
more than 3% cash.
36 It is an exemption from individual institutional limits if an insurance undertaking has a more than 50
per cent participation in an investment fund, because in this case the supervisor of the insurance
undertaking also has to consider the operation of the fund and its assets when evaluating the insurer.was not hindered formally by data protection and confidentiality requirements in
the directives already in force before the collapse of BCCI, nevertheless the flow of
information was (and in several cases it is even today) interrupted. 
The cooperation of supervisory authorities in different countries and inside a
country is hindered to a various extent by different sectoral directives.
Cooperation among supervisory authorities takes place in the case of credit insti-
tutions and investment firms when it concerns obtaining information about new
owners and when evaluating their suitability. In the case of insurance undertak-
ings, however, there is no measure like this in the directive. In the case of cross-
border financial groups, supervisory cooperation agreements form the framework
of cooperation and the performance of consolidated supervision functions.
Directives on credit institutions, investment firms and insurance groups also pro-
vide for this if these institutions belong to the one and the same group. Then the
supervisory authorities have to cooperate closely and transfer information sup-
porting each other’s work.
Experience of the cooperation of supervisory authorities in the EU in the nineties
indicated that the present supervision of cross-border financial conglomerates
and groups would be executed in nearly all cases through the Memoranda of
Understanding (MoU) defining the target of cooperation. In special cases a sim-
ilar agreement may define the competent supervisory authority performing the
consolidated surveillance if the provision of the directive is not clear (for exam-
ple, a holding company is registered in a country where its members or at least
one of its credit institutions are registered, or the parent company is a credit insti-
tution; then the supervisor of the credit institution is responsible for the consoli-
dated surveillance).
During cross-border acquisitions the cooperation and distribution of work between
different levels of acquisition, the supervision of institutions acquiring participation
and the supervision of the acquired institution will considerably change.
Acquisition might be rejected by the supervisory authorities of both countries,
either because the new acquisition will weaken the financial position of the acquir-
ing institution, or because the new owner is deemed incompetent to assure the
proper management of the institution. The supervisory authority of the institution
acquiring the participation is responsible for the consolidated supervision and to
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concerned. The supervisory authority of the institution acquired executes the
observance of rules of acquisition, and thus the institution purchasing the partici-
pation has to cooperate with this supervision, too. As so far as an institution
acquired becomes a subsidiary, the supervision of the subsidiary may perform the
individual surveillance of the subsidiary and it may collect information on other
members of the group only if it has a separate agreement concluded with the
supervision of the parent company. The last step during the acquisition is, if the
institution acquired becomes a branch, then the surveillance of the branch is lim-
ited to an investigation of the liquidity position.
The case of BCCI called attention to the fact that all these orders are not sufficient
to undertake efficient surveillance over financial groups which are supervised by
several supervisory authorities, or over institutions where the contacts with and
accessibility of owners is not clear. It also called the attention to the fact that, in
order to discover the problems of institutions, the information is needed from all the
authorities which make surveillances of these institutions or have possession of
any data connected with them.
4.2. The post-BCCI directive
Directive 1995/26/EC, the so-called post-BCCI directive, modified the regulation
of all institutions supervised in the financial sector with tightening supervisory
licensing and strengthening cooperation between supervisors. Thus there are
amended credit institutions directives 77/780/EEC and 89/646/EEC, non-life
insurance directives 73/329/EEC and 92/49/EEC, life insurance directives
79/267//EEC and 92/96/EEC, investment services directive 93/22/EEC and a
directive on undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities
(UCITS) 85/611/EEC. The obvious purpose of the directive was to prevent the
establishment of institutions like BCCI, which were created evidently to make use
of different regulatory requirements in different countries, the improper cooperation
of supervisory authorities and, as a consequence, making use of hidden relations
which were not discovered by supervisory authorities. To discover hidden relations
a new definition was introduced: close link.
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Supervisors may refuse to issue authorization or might withdraw it if the ownership
and control is a ‘close link’ one, hindering efficient supervisory work. Close link is
defined by the directive as the contact when there is a participation or control rela-
tionship between two natural or legal persons.
Participation relationship exists if one person has permanent ownership over 20
per cent of the capital or voting rights (directly or via control). Control relationship
is the parent-subsidiary (according to the directive on accountancy) or similar
contact. The parent-subsidiary contact is detailed in the accountancy regulation
and makes it compulsory to elaborate a consolidated financial report. In the sense
of the accountancy directive, that undertaking controls another one which
– owns the majority of voting rights
– is in the position to nominate or recall a majority of managers and which is at the
same time a shareholder or member of the undertaking
– according to the statute or contract has a dominant influence in the undertaking
and at the same time is a shareholder or member of the undertaking
– solely on the basis of its votes the majority of the leaders was nominated (and
there is no other parent company which would satisfy the previous 3 points) and
at the same time is a shareholder or member of the undertaking
– with voting rights acquired through an agreement or contract controls the under-
taking on its own and at the same time is a shareholder or member of the under-
taking.
Similarly, it is a control relationship and the undertaking can be compelled to sub-
mit a consolidated financial report if it is in a participation relationship with anoth-
er undertaking and over and beyond
– it practically has a dominant influence in the other undertaking or
– they are managed on a unified basis because they have a common parent com-
pany.
It seems that the person who is able to influence the activity of the institutions will
also be determined basically through ownership or membership relation in the
future. The decisive difference is the consideration of natural persons, and the
addition “similar to that” regarding control relationship, which turns definitions
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contact, while not making necessary the presence of a participation or member-
ship relation.
A close link will be evaluated between two legal entities in a sister relationship, too,
if they are in a control relationship with a natural or legal person.
If there is a direct permanent participation or control relationship between two
institutions, than there is a close link between them and they form a group. If,
however, there is a multiple chain, i.e. the subsidiary has a subsidiary (control rela-
tionship) or other participation relations, close link will be “inherited” via the con-
trol relation only. This is shown in the figure below:
Similarly, two companies in a sister relation are not in close link if one of them is
only in participation relationship with the parent company.
Thanks to the post-BCCI directives, sectoral directives
37 all include the provision
that supervisory authorities may reject authorization or revoke a licence if owner-
ship and controlling (close) links or legal rules in third countries relating entities in



























37 Directive 2000/12/EC on credit institutions, Directive 92/49/EEC on non-life insurance, Directive
92/96/EEC on life insurance, Directive 93/22/EEC on investment services and Directive
2001/107/EC on asset management.to the supply of information, thus it may happen that legal rules restrict the flow of
information. The supervisory authority should be informed continuously about
close links and about changes in obstacles relating to close links, not only at the
time of authorization. 
The amendment reflects the lesson of the BCCI case, i.e. the supervisory authori-
ty has to see who are those influencing the operation, profitability, solvency of
the supervised institution, because the supervision of the institution alone is not
sufficient.
At the same time the EU directives give the minimum interpretation of the defini-
tion of close link, compared to which member states might be much stricter by
interpreting other relationships also as close links.
Definition of close link in the British regulation
Definition of close link in Britain is not much different from the definition in
the EU directives. The difference is that close link between parent, subsidiary
and sister company is accomplished with persons, the instructions, and
orders of whom are followed by the institution’s managers.
It is about a parent company or subsidiary, if any of the seven characteris-
tics of the controlling relation listed in the EU directive is present and the
eighth characteristic is, if a certain person owns a participation of over 20 %
of the voting right or capital. Thus certain relations will be differently aggre-
gated, when participation relationship is defined also as parent-subsidiary
relationship (participation of over 20 % of the voting right or capital). In the





















controlling relation "spreads" close link, parent-subsidiary relation repre-
senting participation does not spreads, just like in the EU directive.
Close link  in the German regulation
The German regulation defines close link among natural and legal persons,
where directly or indirectly they own 20 % of voting rights or capital, and
there is a parent, subsidiary, sister or similar relationship among them.
Practically, they took over the definitions of the directive and they did not
strengthen the prescriptions of the directive with enlarging the "list" of the
contacts.
4.2.2. Unity of head office and registered office 
Insufficiencies in the regulation relating to opting for competent supervisory
authorities became obvious in connection with the BCCI case. The organizational
structure and the geographical location of the financial sector’s institutions’ activi-
ty is often the result of different regulatory requirements, and it is obvious that the
home of a registered office and the main geographical location of activity are often
different, because the requirements on the site of the registered office are looser.
Thus financial entities may use geographical regulatory arbitrage when choosing
office locations. In order to arrest this tendency the directive stipulates that a
licence is to be issued only if the head office and registered office are in the same
member state. In the case of credit institutions it is also regulated that only the
member state with the centre of operation may issue the licence. The definition of
head office is stipulated by each member state on its own. In the British regulation,
for example, that member state is regarded as having the head office, where the
centre of management and control is.
4.2.3. Cooperation of supervisory authorities and other authorities
The post-BCCI directive put the cooperation of supervisory authorities and the
possibility of requiring information from each other on a much broader basis. The
scope of owners and institutions to be investigated extended with the new def-inition, close link, and ensuring efficient supervision was made a crucial crite-
rion. If a close link of owners and a supervised institution hinders efficient super-
vision, the licence can be refused. In order to perform efficient supervision the
cooperation of supervisory authorities and other authorities is needed and super-
visory authorities are to be provided with more information. Exchange of infor-
mation and cooperation was constrained earlier to institutions under consolidat-
ed supervision.
Obviously this type of exchange of information is subjected to a certain kind of
data protection requirement. Regarding the difficulties, however, the amendments
of the post-BCCI directive authorize member states explicitly to allow in the course
of the supervision of credit institutions, investment firms, insurance undertakings
and UCITSs the exchange of information between relevant supervisory authorities
and liquidators, auditors, actuarial supervisors, authorities investigating the obser-
vance of corporate law and central banks. Licences and agreements on the
exchange of information have to include under what conditions and for what pur-
pose the exchange of information takes place, in order not to compromise data
protection requirements. The exchange of information with supervisory authorities
in other countries should be regulated by a memorandum of understanding
between supervisory authorities and the exchange of data should only take place
for the purpose stipulated in the agreement.
For supervisory authorities the mutual knowledge of closely linked institutions and
the information available from other authorities provide data giving insight into the
dependence of a supervised institution vis-à-vis a group. Thus, the reporting obli-
gation is not doubled or multiplied for market players. As an interesting provision
of the directive, the relevant supervisory authorities may require information from
authorities supervising corporate law as well, since thus they may acquire some
information about institutions, i.e. on holding companies not falling under the
scope of their supervision. This, however, is possible only in definite cases, when
it is necessary for performing their supervisory activity. The directive provides for
the case - which was in force in a few member states already - whereby auditors
have to report to the supervisory authority any problem or abuse realized not only
by institutions under the scope of their supervision, but by any (even non finan-
cial) institutions which are in close link with a financial undertaking. 
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In the present regulation of the financial sector it is an inadequacy that only the
group-wide regulation of homogeneous groups (credit institution-credit institu-
tion, credit institution-investment firm, investment firm-investment firm, insur-
ance group) has taken place in sectoral rules and the group of insurance under-
takings with credit institutions and investment firms was not regulated. The
participation of insurance undertakings with other financial institutions and
investment firms in one holding, the so-called conglomerate, creates a new risk,
mainly through the regulatory arbitrage possibilities among sectors and non-
equal conditions of competition. Thus a new directive was elaborated on the
supplementary supervision of financial undertakings creating a conglomerate,
the parliamentary debate of which is going on at the time of preparing this pres-
ent paper (Q2 2002). The new directive does not replace existing sectoral rules,
but it creates the supplementary supervision of conglomerates acting in differ-
ent financial sectors. Its purpose is to make up for insufficiencies due to sec-
toral regulation, to eliminate non-consistent overlapping and to create efficient
supervision of financial groups.
In parallel with the new directive, sectoral rules will be amended and clarified by
harmonizing certain definitions  (participation, joint venture, holding company,
etc.) and contacts with supervisory authorities. It places mutual cooperation of
supervisory authorities on a common basis, and modifies the calculation of own
capital (deduction of participations in other financial institutions from own capital)
and rules relating to intra-group transactions.
The new directive enables supervisory authorities to evaluate group-wide
– the meeting of capital adequacy requirements (restricting in this way multiple
capital gearing and excessive leverage),
– risk concentration and
– intra-group transactions.
Even in the parliamentary phase of the legal procedure (first reading) an intense
debate emerged about how it should be decided which institutes belong to one con-
glomerate. Should it be decided upon “close link” or supplementing the funda-
mental rule with the parent-subsidiary relationship, or should the opinion of the
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credit institutions?
Besides the definition of close link in earlier directives the new draft includes the
case when one institution exercises a dominant influence on the other only in the
opinion of the supervisory authority. Moreover, it consider relationships as a close
link when there is no participation, yet the relationship influences the activity of the
institutions, or there is a common management, or the majority of the leaders are
the same persons. With this new definition the scope of the group is extended to
cases where there is no participation relationship between the two institutions, but
where in the sense of accounting rules they are to be consolidated (permanent
influencing relationship, common management, common leaders), or they are not
even consolidated by accounting rules (opinion of the supervisory authority).
38
Besides groups with homogeneous activity already regulated, now the regulation
and surveillance of financial conglomerates is taking place. There are two steps in
deciding which are the groups to be defined as financial conglomerates.
In the first step is to decide whether there is a financial group as such. This depends
on the proportion of regulated and non-regulated (i.e. holding company) financial
undertakings in the group. The next step concerns the significance of activity in
different financial sectors (banking and investment service activity is the same
sector), thus connecting insurance activity to a different financial activity.
According to the draft of the directive, the inter-sectoral activity is significant if
total assets or capital requirement of the smallest institution acting in the finan-
cial sector exceeds 10 per cent of the indicators of the group. If a regulated finan-
cial institution (bank, investment firm or insurance undertaking) is leading the
group and the group is also active in other sectors, then it is a financial conglom-
erate, irrespective of the proportions within the group.
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38 In the debate going on during the elaboration of this study the opinion of the European Parliament
was that the definition of close link and the rules connected with it should be left unchanged; thus, the
surveillance of legal or natural persons in close link should be connected to the refusal or revocation
of a licence. The consolidated reporting obligation would be adjusted in line with the previous sectoral
directives, only its scope would be extended to all the institutions mentioned by the draft acting in dif-
ferent financial sectors. Accordingly, besides a parent-subsidiary relationship the opinion of the
supervisory authority would determine which has a dominant influence. With this modification they
could ensure that, in contrast to the conglomerate based on close link, institutions merely in partici-
pation relationship, or managed on a unified basis but in reality not having a significant influence,
would not automatically become a member of the group and the supervision’s discretion would decide
the matter.78
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The draft introduces a new institutional form against the earlier institutional sys-
tem, the mixed financial holding company, the holding company which is on the
top of the financial conglomerate. Groups with inter-sectoral activities could be
ranked into the definition of mixed activity holding company and mixed activity
insurance holding company until now, too, but group-wide capital requirement
regulation, the definition of competent supervision and the obligation of providing
information did not relate to them. With the introduction of the new regulation,
mixed financial holding companies are to be assigned on the basis of precise def-
inition. Other holding companies (financial holding company, mixed activity hold-
ing company, insurance holding company, mixed activity insurance holding com-
pany) are inversely defined, i.e. from among earlier holding companies those are
not included in the group which are not mixed financial holding companies.
The supplementary supervision relating to conglomerates also stipulates group-
wide requirements for institutions not yet regulated (newly defined holding com-
panies). The supervision of these institutions on an individual basis, however, is
not necessary. In the sectoral directives presently in force the aspect is the same,
since for financial institutions (thus for a financial holding) or insurance holding
companies prescriptions of risk and diversification limits and capital requirements
are not applied. However, if they belong to one and the same scope of consolida-
tion with regulated institutions then group-wide requirements take account for their
risk exposures, too. 
4.3.1. Up-to-date nature of the directive and the Financial
Conglomerates Committee
Since financial conglomerates are rapidly changing organizations, their organiza-
tional structure and geographical location is often created to make use of imper-
fections in the law. Thus the directive enables the Commission to interpret the def-
initions of a conglomerate at any time due to developments on the financial mar-
kets, or to ensure their uniform application. This should proceed in the same way
in the case of technical and substantial definitions of capital requirements. With
these clarifications there is no need to amend the directive if the development of
the financial markets overtakes the level included in this directive. TheCommission’s work is supported by the Financial Conglomerates Committee,
where all member countries are represented.
4.3.2. Consolidation of group members outside the member states
The proposal - in order to create a level playing field - attempts to ensure an equal
regulation environment for groups with parent companies outside the member
states. If the competent supervisory authority is certain, and the Council acknowl-
edges it within two months, that the regulation of the third country is equivalent
with that of the EU, then, assuming the cooperation of supervisory authorities, the
supervision in the third country will oversee the observance of group-wide require-
ments. If the rules are not equivalent, the competent supervisory authority of the
EU member state might prescribe that institutions registered in member states
belonging to the group should create a mixed financial holding company and this
sub-group should be treated in line with the new directive.
4.3.3. Prudential rules relating to financial conglomerates
4.3.3.1. Capital adequacy requirements
In addition to rules relating to capital requirements the directive encourages the
supervisory authorities of member states to ensure an adequate capital allocation
policy and to implement internal control mechanisms on the conglomerate level as
well. The competent supervisory authority or member state may decide in certain
cases which group members should belong under the consolidated capital ade-
quacy requirement. Thus it is not necessary to take into consideration group mem-
bers which are in third countries and where legal barriers constrain the availability
of information, or they are negligible from the point of view of the consolidated
supervision (if, however, several negligible members together are significant, they
are to be included) and if the drawing in of the group member would result in a mis-
leading assessment.
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Due to inconsistent results of full-scale consolidation and pro-rata consolidation
(the latter regards minority owners as independent owners) presented in the sec-
tion on regulating homogeneous groups, the Council decided in the proposal about
the prescription of a conservative procedure of regulation like in the case of an
insurance group. The regulation stipulates full-scale consolidation if the subsidiary
is undercapitalised and a pro-rata consolidation if it has a capital surplus. Taking
into account the subsidiary’s total capital deficit is considered because if there are
financial problems it is the responsibility first of all of the majority owner to inter-
vene and provide help.
4.3.3.1.2. Capital elements to be selected on group-wide level 
Capital elements eligible under sectoral rules are to meet individual level capital
requirements. Certain capital elements and the volume and proportion of accept-
able capital elements are stipulated by legal rules relating to the course of business
risks and risk management common in that sector. At the conglomerate level,
however, only capital elements might be accepted which are mutually recognized
by the regulation of individual sectors. Limits prevailing among individual capital
elements on the individual level are to be applied with appropriate modifications
(mutatis mutandis) on group-wide level, too. Thus, tier 2 elements may not exceed
100 per cent of the core capital even on group-wide level, as was the rule in the
case of banks and investment firms beforehand.
Besides capital elements eligible on a group-wide level, there will be capital ele-
ments which are also to be allocated in the future exclusively to risks arising from
banking and investment activity or insurance risks. Thus, members of a conglom-
erate have to meet their individual capital requirements primarily from these capi-
tal elements, in order that its total capital surplus should come from capital ele-
ments which are acceptable on a group-wide level. Thus, for example, only banks
may include general provisions as capital element and only up to the level the reg-
ulation of the sector allows. If it disposes of a surplus in general provisions, this will
get lost for the group as a whole. 
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cerning the quality of capital will be stipulated. Thus there is no possibility for the
capital adequacy on the group-wide level to be ensured on the basis of capital ele-
ments which are not eligible for the other sector, thus banking or insurance risk
would be undercovered. 
4.3.3.2. Intra-group transactions and risk concentration
With reference to what was said about homogeneous groups earlier, in the case of
conglomerates it is even more correct to say that the existence of group-wide
transactions in itself is a good thing, but interdependence resulting from group-
wide transactions and pricing may give rise to additional risks.
The EU regulators did not find it necessary to introduce any quantitative limits on
any risk concentration in the case of conglomerates; however, member states may
set such definitions. Instead of quantitative limits they stipulated a reporting
requirement for significant transactions and risks. The relevant supervisory author-
ities may determine what is to be regarded as significant transaction or risk in pro-
portion to the capital or, in the case of insurance undertakings, to technical
reserves. The directive did not made any decisions on this level because this deci-
sion requires consideration of the nature, management and risk management
structure of the group.
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Credit institutions investment firms (CAD, Own funds Directive)
Life and non-life insurance institution (1st Life Directive as amended by 3rd Life Directive 
and 1st Non-Life Directive as amended by 3rd Non-Life Directive) 
Paid-up share capital 
Capital reserve (not explicitly mentioned with insurance undertakings, but included) 
Reserves (in the sense of 78/660/EEC, not technical reserves) 
Revaluation reserves (not explicitly mentioned with insurance undertakings, but included) 
Retained earnings (profit brought forward from the previous years)  
Interim profits, under certain conditions (net profits realized in trading books, too) 
Subordinated instruments of indeterminate duration under certain conditions, including undated cumulative pre-
ferred shares 
Subordinated liabilities, under certain conditions, including fixed-term cumulative preferred shares  
Table 4 Capital elements eligible on a group-wide level Instead of quantitative limits there are 3 pillars regulating transactions and risk
exposure: a management policy connected to internal transactions and risk aware-
ness, a reporting obligation and efficient supervision.
The new directive also modifies existing sectoral directives. The calculation of reg-
ulatory capital was complemented with investment limits. If the participation of an
insurance undertaking, credit institution or investment firm exceeds 10 per cent of
the capital of the other insurance or reinsurance undertaking, credit institution or
financial institution, that should be covered by capital. The own funds calculation
made on an individual basis may deviate from this rule, if they are subjected to a
consolidated supervision, or if the participation was acquired temporarily. This rule
was in force already earlier for credit institutions and investment firms, but the scope
of other institutions exempted included insurance and reinsurance undertakings.
4.3.3.3. Evaluation of the management – cooperation of supervisory authorities
Sectoral directives always provided that supervisory authorities should be informed
about the appropriateness of owners and the abilities, experience and reputation of
managers (“fit and proper requirement”) before a nomination or acquisition. The
BCCI case called the attention of regulators to the importance of investigating
whether persons in “close link” with managers or owners hinder them in properly
exercising their duties. Even previously the directives of banking and investment
firms prescribed prior consultation with the competent supervisory authorities, in
order to gather information about future owners, managers and their “close links”.
The directive on insurance undertakings does not include a regulation like that. The
directive on conglomerates, therefore, stipulates that insurance undertaking super-
visors should also ask for the opinion of the supervisory authority in the other
member state, if
– the insurance undertaking is a subsidiary of an insurance undertaking, credit
institution of investment firm in another member state, 
– the insurance undertaking is a subsidiary of a parent company which has an
insurer, credit institution or investment firm subsidiary in another country,
– it will be controlled by a natural or legal person which has an insurer, credit insti-
tution or investment firm in another member state.
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investment firms, but insurance undertakings were not included in the range of
institutions with this obligation. Thus Directive 12/2000 was also amended in line
with the above-mentioned definition.
4.3.4. Coordinator among supervisory authorities
In view of the cross-sector and cross-border supervisory requirement of financial
conglomerates, the directive deals with the cooperation among supervisory author-
ities and with the selection and responsibility of a coordinator, who is responsible
for the cooperation among supervisory authorities. The purpose of the coordina-
tor’s selection is to have a responsible, authorized organization which
– has an overview of the conglomerate as a whole, and even of niches not covered
by the  competent supervisory authorities,
– is able to prevent double supervisory surveillance; thus surveillance is more cost
effective both for supervisory authorities and market players,
– facilitates simpler procedures and more effective supervision.
Sectoral supervision meant until now that different supervisory authorities investi-
gated only individual institutions or different separated sub-groups. If a conglom-
erate as a whole comes under the control of one supervisory authority, it is impor-
tant that cooperation among supervisory authorities should be created, which
involves awareness with the risk profile of different sectors calling for unified pru-
dential requirements. When deciding on the creation of the supervisory coordina-
tor’s function, the directive followed the recommendations of the Joint Forum in
1999. There are only viewpoints formulated in the directive regarding the selection
of the coordinator, in order to leave way for selecting the competent supervisory
authority by taking into consideration the organizational and risk features of the
given conglomerate.
If there is no immediate understanding among the supervisory authorities regard-
ing the coordinator, either the supervisory authority controlling the leading body of
the conglomerate or, if the leading body is a holding company (which was not
supervised on an individual basis), the supervisory authority of one of the super-
vised institutions registered in the same member as the holding company, or the
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glomerate will perform the task of coordination.
responsibilities of the coordinator involve:
– continuous gathering and dissemination of information and data
– evaluation of the financial position of the conglomerate, monitoring the fulfilment
of group-wide prudential rules (capital adequacy, intra-group transactions, con-
centration of risks)
– information on the organizational structure, internal control system of the finan-
cial conglomerate
– outlining and coordinating procedures of supervisions.
With this new distribution of work among supervisory authorities the EU legisla-
tors did not want to create a new form of supervision, a new institution. The tasks
and responsibilities of supervisory authorities stipulated by sectoral rules are still
in force.
The directive deals with the legal background of the exchange of information
among supervisory authorities, especially with the authority of the coordinator to
obtain access to information, which can be neglected only in exceptional cases.
The information forwarded is related first of all to identification of the members of
the group and competent supervisors, the strategy of the conglomerate, M&A
plans, financial position, significant shareholders and leaders, organizational, risk
management and internal control systems and the verification of information.
The directive also draws central banks into the exchange of information – in their
capacity as the monetary authority and the authority responsible for overseeing
payment systems – in order to ensure that they should get all the information
required at any time without doubling the burden of date supply.
The directive states that the requirements relating to the secret and confidential
handling of information stipulated earlier in the sectoral rules are still in force; thus
these rules are not compromised.
4.3.5. Changes affecting market players 
The directive relates to all groups operating in all financial sectors, irrespective of
their size. These groups and conglomerates, as of the application of the directive,
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tion, intra-group transactions, the fit and proper nature of managers, and the
information about their contacts. The directive prescribes one more reporting obli-
gation, and creates the possibility for the supervisory authority to acquire and
monitor all the information which relates to the conglomerate as a whole and its
regular operation.
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The elaboration and practice of the legal rules of financial undertakings and con-
solidated supervision is inconsistent in the law and practice of supervision in
Hungary. As a result of legal harmonization, the amendment (Act CXXIV of 2000)
of the Act on Credit Institutions (Act CXII of 1996) introduced a new chapter on
consolidated supervision into the Act. As a next step forward, the trading book’s
regulations
39 introduced similar prescriptions when formulating the capital require-
ments of market risks. Thus the provisions regarding group-wide supervision of
credit institutions are formally harmonized. However, there are errors in both def-
inition and procedure, which have the consequence that the substance of the
Hungarian regulation does not meet either the purpose of legal harmonization or
the goals of consolidated regulation. As a result of these errors and still existing
insufficiencies, the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority (in the Hungarian
acronym: PSZAF) does not require consolidated data supply. Insufficiencies and
errors, which deviate fundamentally from the logic of group-wide supervision,
relate to two areas: the scope of institutions to be consolidated with the purpose
of prudential surveillance and the method of calculation of consolidated own
funds and capital adequacy. 
Nevertheless, the Hungarian supervisory authorities has to be informed about
financial groups, about their aggregated risk exposures, even though legal insuffi-
ciencies exists. Hungarian financial undertakings also have to observe group-wide
requirements, because otherwise individual prudential provisions can be easily cir-
cumvented and dependencies remain uncovered not only for the supervision but
for financial undertakings as well. Hence, for groups including a credit institution
an attempt was initiated in autumn 2001 to amend legislation and in Q1 2002 the
supervisory authority ordered an extraordinary supply of consolidated data. 
Financial undertakings not belonging to any credit institution are not subjected to
group-wide requirements, even formally. Thus, in financial groups with no credit
institution there is no consolidated requirement either. Hence, consolidated
reporting rules do not relate to homogenous groups of investment firms or groups
controlled by an investment firm, which were already subjected to regulations in
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39 Government Decree No. 244/2000 (XII.24)the EU as of 1993, nor, similarly to the insufficiencies of the EU directives, to insur-
ance undertaking or asset management company group members. Group-wide
regulations relating to insurance undertakings do not exist in the Hungarian regu-
lation. The definition of different institutions, like insurance holding company or
mixed activity insurance holding company, is also missing.
40 The trading book reg-
ulations do not surpass the threshold of credit institutions either, since consolidat-
ed requirements stipulated in this regulation relate only to the controlling credit
institution and its subsidiaries keeping the trading book, i.e. only specific members
of the banking group.
Similar to the chapter discussing EU regulation, we overview first regulations relat-
ed to the organizational structure of financial groups, thus determining the corpo-
rate structure of financial groups. Then we summarize regulations about group-
wide prudential requirements and supervision. We investigate Hungarian rules pri-
marily in relation to the EU regulation in force, the content and logic of which we
have seen in the previous chapter. In this chapter we deal with the deficiencies of
logic in the Hungarian regulation; however, we don’t discuss the guidelines of con-
solidated regulation in as much detail as we made did in the previous chapter.
5.1. Rules regulating the structure of financial groups
According to the Hungarian regulation the activity, organizational and legal struc-
ture of financial group members are influenced not only by the definition of their
exclusive or dominating activity but in the case of credit institutions also the per-
son of owners is strictly regulated in terms of who may acquire considerable own-
ership or voting rights in the individual institutions. This taxative rule, which might
seem strict at first glance, is special for the Hungarian regulation. Other rules defin-
ing organizational structure (exclusive or main activity), reporting obligation of
acquisition, right of veto of supervision) are similar to the EU regulation. It is
arguably an important deficiency that “close link” is not defined and, in the case of
insurance undertakings, in a situation when new owners are incompetent the
supervision has no right of veto.
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40 The planned modification of the Act on Insurance Undertakings (Act XCVI of 1995) will end these
deficiencies.5.1.1. Specialisation principle
Deposit collection, insurance and fund management activities may be executed
only by institutions defined by legal rules just as much in Hungary as in the EU.
Thus, there may be no legal person in Hungary either, who executes all these activ-
ities in one entity. A bank, however, may be involved with the whole range of
investment services.
5.1.2. Acquisition limits 
Pursuant to the Act on Credit Institutions, only the Hungarian government, anoth-
er credit institution, universal postal service provider, insurance undertaking,
investment firm, financial holding company and the Hungarian Deposit Insurance
may acquire a 15 per cent or higher ownership or voting right in a credit institu-
tion. This provision reflects the intentions of the legislators that a not supervised
institution should not acquire decisive ownership in a credit institution. A rule like
this does not exist in the EU, and even in Hungary this range of institutions proved
to be too narrow. Due to this rule, at present in Hungary only mixed activity hold-
ings may be set up, the leading body of which is an insurance undertaking, uni-
versal postal service provider or investment firm. Whereas in the EU it can be any
parent company, which is not a credit institution or financial holding company.
However, among its subsidiaries there can be at least one credit institution.
5.1.3. Right of veto of the supervisory authority
The purchaser of participation is required to inform the authority and apply for a
licence if a qualifying holding is acquired in terms of the acts on Credit Institutions,
Capital Market and Insurance Institutions,
41 or if 15 per cent (act on insurance
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41 Qualifying holding (acts on credit institutions, capital market and insurance institutions): a relation-
ship which enables
a) 10 per cent or higher participation in voting rights, ownership directly or indirectly
b) the nomination or withdrawal of a significant part of the members of leading bodies (Act on
Capital Markets: at least 20 per cent of members)
c) the exercise of dominant influence over operation on the basis of statute or contract.undertakings: 20 percent), 33 percent, 50 per cent and 75 per cent of voting right
or ownership proportion is reached, similar to the regulations of the EU.
The provisions of the Act on Credit Institutions and the Act on Capital Markets
regarding investment firms allow three months for the supervisory authority to
refuse a licence, if the activity of the applicant (owner or leading officer) endangers
proper management of the credit institution or the financial undertaking, or if the
activity, contacts or acquisitions of the applicant hinder the pursuit of efficient
supervision.
42 In this rule certain elements of the post-BCCI directive and a simpli-
fied formulation of close link is reflected. Nevertheless, in contrast to the detailed
explanations of the EU directives, it is not clarified what level of ownership par-
ticipation and relationship might hinder efficient supervision and prudent man-
agement of the institution. This, of course, might have the benefit that the super-
visory authority can develop its own approach.
However, when licensing investment fund managers no prescription requires the
investigation of owners, the owners’ relations and their activities, involving the pos-
sible refusal of a licence. In EU regulation such rules have been in effect since
Directive 2001/107/EC came into force.
The provisions of the Act on Insurance Institutions do not authorize the superviso-
ry authority – in parallel with the notification requirement of acquiring ownership
participation or voting rights – to refuse licensing due to the activity or relationships
of the owner. There is a general clause, however, which enables the supervisory
authority to decide about licensing in view of the interests of the insured and the




42 Act on Credit Institutions Section 39 and Act on Capital Markets Sections 106 and 107 ( c)
43 Act on Insurance Undertakings Section 43. (2)5.2. Consolidated supervision of financial groups
5.2.1. Institutions to be consolidated with prudential purpose
The institutions covered by Hungarian consolidated regulations (Act on Credit
Institutions, Trading book regulations) are shown in the figure below:
The Act on Credit Institutions regulates the consolidated supervision of groups
including credit institutions on three levels, relating to different ranges of institu-
tions.
44 Data supply and the requirement of prudent operation are to be met if there
is at least one credit institution among the members of the group. This is the widest
possible range of institutions and thus members of a banking group, a financial
holding and mixed-activity holdings have to satisfy these requirements. A register
is kept by the supervisory authority on banking groups and financial holdings,
group-wide risk exposure and capital adequacy requirements are related to finan-
cial holdings or banking groups highlighted in grey; the consolidated requirement
stipulated in the trading book relates to investment firms or a financial institution
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44 Act on Credit Institutions, Chapter XIVSince financial holding companies are defined by the Act on Credit Institutions
only, a holding company might be a financial institution, which owns exclusively
financial institutions and investment firms, and at least one of them is a credit insti-
tution. Consequently, a holding company which owns only investment firms and
investment fund managers is not a financial holding company and is not subject to
consolidated supervision.
The major part of consolidated supervisory activities relates to institutions which
belong to banking groups and financial holdings. Pursuant to provisions, institu-
tions may belong to these groups, which are controlled by a credit institution or
financial holding company.
The definition of controlling relation is different from the provisions in EU rules,
despite the fact that they more or less correspond to each other. A controlling rela-
tion according to the Act on Credit Institutions exists: 
if someone based on a contract or on ownership participation
– disposes of the majority of voting rights
– may nominate the majority of managers,
if, due to its financial, organizational and business contacts 
– its leadership is coordinated with a different undertaking
– it can to be instructed to transfer profit, or to take over losses
– it owns voting or leadership rights over and above ownership participation, which
is declared as voting shares,
if the majority of leaders is identical with the leaders of other undertakings.
The EU regulation identifies financial groups on the basis of the existence of par-
ent-subsidiary relationship. Financial directives define parent-subsidiary rela-
tions specified in the directive on accountancy (83/349/EEC). However, from
the point of view of consolidated supervision parent companies are institutions
which are in a participation or capital tie other than defined in the accounting
directives relationship, though according to the supervision’s view they are able
to exercise dominant or significant influence on the activity of the other. In addi-





45 As a reminder: direct or indirect permanent participation exceeding 20% of voting rights or ownership.
In the case of insurers also permanent relationship.Hungarian regulation deals with the controlling relationship only in the case of a
banking group (group led by a credit institution) when, of the share capital, more
than 20 per cent is owned by an undertaking belonging to a banking group,
46 or
which is controlled by a person together with an undertaking belonging to a
banking group. Nevertheless, the supervisory authority does not have the pos-
sibility of using discretionary instruments and it is quite a crucial deficiency,
too, that institutions not belong to a banking group can have 20 per cent or
more of voting rights.
5.2.2. Limitations in defining the institutions which are to be con-
solidated on a prudential basis
The provisions of consolidated requirement are one-sided in the Hungarian regula-
tion of the financial sector, since only the Act on Credit Institutions deals with this
problem. The supervision of insurance groups is under elaboration in 2002, at the
time of writing this study, so we may only suppose that rules will be created in line
with directive 98/78/EC, with a view to legal harmonization. Due to the lack of
comparable regulations in the Act on Capital Markets the asymmetry of regulation
will prevail, despite the expected creation of the consolidated supervision of insur-
ance groups.
The example of investment firms and credit institutions demonstrates asymmetric
consolidation requirements. In the case where a credit institution controls an
investment firm, pursuant to the Act on Credit Institutions they have to comply with
group-wide prudential limits, capital adequacy, and, according to the trading book
regulations, the evaluation of market risks will be made in a way as if they were
one and the same institution.
47 However, if an investment firm is controlling a cred-
it institution, they will be qualified as a mixed activity holding and thus they have
to satisfy data supplying requirements on an individual basis; on a group-wide level
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46 The Act on Credit Institutions mentions in this case only participation over 20% of share capital and
it does not mention higher than 20% of voting rights.
47 In the Trading book position risk, FX-risk and large exposure are stated on an aggregated basis (“as
they would be if one institution”). On calculating the capital requirement of the partner risk this is not
followed, then only claims against each other might be disregarded. Besides aggregated require-
ments, they also have to satisfy capital requirements on the individual basis. Group members have to
meet capital requirements on the aggregated basis and individual basis as well.they have no prescription to meet. This, of course, is a benefit for both institutions
in that with multiple capital gearing they have the possibility of circumventing indi-
vidual limits. On the other hand, transactions towards each other will not be
exempt from large exposure limits (nor participations from investment limits and
capital deductions), which might considerably deteriorate the organizational and
economic efficiency of the holding.
In view of this regulation asymmetry, it is a relevant question in Hungary whether
a credit institution or an investment firm owns an investment fund manager. The
first one creates a banking group according to the Act on Credit Institutions, thus
it has to supply data to the supervisory authority. The investment firm and the fund
manager owned by it, on the other hand, are registered from the point of view of
consolidated supervision as two independent institutions.
EU regulation does not include differences like this. Directive 93/6/EEC CAD
says that a credit institution and financial institution owned by an investment
firm is not qualified as a mixed activity holding. From the point of view of reg-
ulation, this is equivalent to an investment firm and financial institution owned
by a credit institution.
Besides requirements depending on organizational structure, inconsistent defini-
tions confuse the interpretation of related legal rules. Pursuant to the definition of
a financial holding, a financial holding company and all the institutions controlled
by it (financial institution, investment firm, insurance undertaking and other under-
taking) make up a holding. A financial holding company, on the other hand, may
own only financial institutions and investment firms. Thus it is not clear whether a
financial holding company may exist at all where the financial holding company
controls an insurance undertaking or investment fund manager, or where the insur-
ance undertaking becomes a member of the holding as a subsidiary of a credit
institution. The latter would be an obvious development. This, however, needs a
provision to clarify the “legacy” of the controlling relationship.
48
Apart from definition problems and the force of consolidated supervision, the cri-
terion of building groups, the controlling and participation relationship itself is
not equivalent with definitions in the EU directives either. The most important dif-
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48 This provision should state that if one institution (A) controls an institution (B) which, in turn, con-
trols a third institution (C), then this one (C) is under the control of the first one (A).ference concerns the discretionary power of the supervisory authority. The EU
provisions for similar cases are built on the experience that the strength of mutu-
al dependency of institutions, the basis of identifying group members, might not
be based exclusively upon tight specifications. Tight specifications can sometimes
be circumvented, but at any time the opinion of the supervisory authority may
decide upon the question of dominating influence between two institutions.
As a technical fault, the legal rule stipulates that a participation relationship was
made dependent exclusively on the proportion of ownership in share capital, while
the ownership of voting rights above 20 per cent as a decisive influence was left out.
Due to the above-mentioned problems the scope of institutions and the relation-
ship among institutions, on the basis of which individual market players are reg-
istered as groups and are treated as one entity from the point of view of risk
exposures, is different in Hungary and the EU countries. 
5.2.3. Prudential rules
The scope of the EU’s credit institution directive and the Act on Credit Institutions
regarding group-wide limits and capital requirements reflect differences, even irre-
spective of the above-mentioned institutional asymmetry. These requirements are
very important during consolidated supervision, since they enable interdependent
institutions be treated from the point of view of risk exposure as a single institution,
and transactions aimed at evading individual limits, so-called regulatory arbitrage,
are eliminated.
Directive 2000/12/EC regulates these requirements according to the scope of a
sectoral directive. Thus the scope of consolidation will be stipulated among insti-
tutions  subject to the given directive. In the case of the banking system this
means, for example, that only credit institutions and financial institutions
49 have to
meet prudential requirements on a group-wide level, while with insurance under-
takings connected to them this is not necessary. The reason for that is basically the
fact that these are financial undertakings with different regulation, and the require-
ments of prudential regulation concern the business procedures, risks and risk
management of the related sector.
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49 The EU definition of financial institutions also includes investment undertakingsThe Act on Credit Institutions, on the other hand, in certain sections
50 stipulates for
all the undertakings controlled by a credit institution and a financial holding com-
pany (financial institution, investment firm, insurance undertaking) the calculation
of capital adequacy on an aggregated basis and the fulfilment of aggregated lim-
its. In an inconsistent way, however, it is only for financial institutions and invest-
ment firms that these provisions specify precisely which requirements they have to
meet together and how. Yet even in their case a specific provision regulating the
calculation of own funds on an aggregated basis was not elaborated.
From a certain point of view, however, it is a positive development that the Act on
Credit Institutions prescribes the group-wide fulfilment of prudential requirements
for all regulated (by capital requirement or risk limits) entities. Hence the EU con-
glomerate regulation has the same objective. However, the problems and questions
presented in the sections
51 on this subject illustrate most clearly how dubious and
in many cases controversial are the provisions of group-wide requirements for
institutions with different scopes of operation.
5.2.3.1. Group-wide capital adequacy
The provisions of group-wide capital of financial undertakings with similar risks
(credit institutions, investment firms), identical prudential requirements and own
fund capital elements will not pose special problems. The well-known accounting
consolidation will do in their case to present risk exposure of the group and to state
limits and prescriptions adequate for the risk exposure out of the consolidated bal-
ance sheet. The special decree on the calculation of the regulatory capital has to
decide first of all about questions as to which capital level (tier 1, 2 or 3) new cap-
ital elements created as a result of the consolidation will belong, how minority own-
ers should be considered etc.
From the time when one group fulfils the requirements of aggregated capital ade-
quacy, it is not necessary to deduct its holding acquired in other institutions when
calculating individual regulatory capital. The sorting out of multiple capital gearing
is already accomplished by calculating regulatory capital on an aggregated basis.
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50 Section 92 (2-3)
51 See chapter 4.Thus, if they meet requirements together, it is not necessary to cover investments
related to each other with capital on an individual basis. In the presentation of EU
regulations we mentioned the convenience of this practice. The Hungarian regula-
tion, however, does not allow an exemption like that.  This means that, in the
course of individual calculation of credit institutions’ own funds, holdings in each
financial institution, insurance undertaking and investment firm should be deduct-
ed, if they represent a qualifying holding, or exceed 10 per cent of the credit insti-
tution’s regulatory capital, irrespective of whether it meets the requirement of con-
solidated capital adequacy or not.
Provision of consolidated own funds of institutions with different activity and differ-
ent regulation and numerical determination of group-wide risk limits, however, is a
much more complex task requiring the observance of several considerations,
which cannot be regulated by two paragraphs.
52 In this case, accounting consoli-
dation is not an appropriate method for prudential consolidating of heterogeneous
groups, to regulate risk exposure of the group. As mentioned earlier, the consoli-
dation of institutions with completely different balance structure would result in a
misleading evaluation. The consolidated balance sheet of a bank and an institution
operating in another sector, for example an insurance undertaking or a non-regu-
lated institution, is not appropriate to indicate banking risks and to state banking
limits, nor any requirements based on the balance sheet. The same is true for the
insurance risk, where the core risk is the uncertainty of the value of liabilities and
the change in the value of assets supporting them. The reserve and capital require-
ment of insurance undertakings were stipulated by observing these risks. Thus, in
cases like that the separation of risks of certain activities and the requirements
meeting them might be necessary. Simultaneously, the sorting out of multiple
gearing is also necessary. Methods presented in Table 2 are suitable for this pur-
pose, but not so the aggregation prescribed in the Act on Credit Institutions,
53 since
this does not sort out capital leverages and thus it is unable to define the amount
of the adjusted capital available for the group.
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52 Act on Credit Institutions Section 92.and 94 (5)
53 Pursuant to Section 94 (5) of the Act, when certain conditions are met, the amount proportionate to
the participation of the adjusted capital of the credit institutions, investment undertakings and insur-
ers controlled by the leader credit institution should be added to the adjusted capital of the leader
institution and this produces the aggregated adjusted capital of the group.In the case of heterogeneous groups a further problem is to define capital elements
which can be considered on a group-wide level, since certain capital elements
(mainly reserves) might be used only by institutions which accumulated them.
Moreover, the Hungarian regulation does not elaborate on questions concerning
how capital levels (tier 1/tier 2) in different sectors will influence other sectors, etc.
The measure of capital adequacy of the group as a whole is an eligible target, but
sectoral rules (e.g. in the Act on Credit Institutions), due to their limited scope, are
not suitable for setting unified requirements against institutions in different sectors. 
5.2.3.2. Intra-group transactions and risk concentrations 
Intra-group transactions are not explicitly regulated, similar to the 2000/12/EC
directive of the EU. Provisions regarding reporting requirements of intra-group
transactions are regulated even in the EU in the directive on insurer groups only.
Thus rules relating to risk concentration are those which influence mutual risk
exposure of group members. The relevant Hungarian rules are discussed below, in
a similar structure to the chapter discussing EU regulations.
The provisions limiting risk concentration of different sectoral acts (Act on Credit
Institutions, Act on Capital Markets, Act on Insurance Institutions)
54 were established
in the framework of EU legal harmonization. The quantitative limits completely cor-
respond to the limits in the EU regulation. Differences can be found among the insti-
tutions eligible for exemptions. Some of the differences are due to the different
scope of directives and Hungarian sectoral rules, and the fact that the regulation of
consolidated requirements was not put forward at all (Act on Capital Markets, Act
on Insurance Institutions) or only imperfectly and not consistently in the acts.
When regulating large exposures, the prescriptions of the Act on Capital Markets
do not treat insurance undertakings separately. Investments over 25% of the regu-
latory capital of the credit institution in an insurance undertaking are to be covered
with capital just as much as any holdings acquired in any other undertaking and
risk exposures with a non-parent,  non-subsidiary or non-sister relationship.
55
Similar to the regulations in the EU, pursuant to the Act on Credit Institutions for
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54 The Act on Insurance Institutions is under amendment.
55 EU regulation allows for participation in insurers to be limited at 40%, but only a few member states
make use of this possibility.risk exposure against undertakings in parent, subsidiary or sister relationship no
large exposure limit is involved, if they are under consolidated supervision. When
calculating regulatory capital, however, all those qualifying holdings are to be
deducted which the credit institution acquired in other financial institutions, invest-
ment firms, insurance undertakings or ancillary undertakings, irrespective of
whether they are subject to consolidated supervision. In this sense, however, the
participation acquired in other players of the financial sector will be exempted from
other limits. Nevertheless, they are subjected to much stricter regulations.
The risk exposure of an investment firm against a client or group of clients – simi-
lar to the Act on Credit Institutions – may not exceed 25%, in the case of sub-
sidiaries 20%. However, in contrast with the Act, no exemption is allowed if risk
exposure is oriented towards a parent, subsidiary or sister within the same scope
of consolidation. This is a consequence of the lack of consolidation rules regarding
investment firms, nor is it consistent with the provision of the Act which allows
exemption for a credit institution in one and the same group with the investment
firm, if they belong under consolidated supervision.
The investments of investment firms are limited not only according to ownership
proportion and extent of influence, as in the case of investment limits of credit insti-
tutions, but also according to the type of institution. Pursuant to Section 180 of the
Act on Capital Markets investment firms may hold participations for the purpose of
investment (participation held longer than one year) only in an ancillary undertak-
ing, credit institution, investment firm, commodity exchange, insurance undertak-
ing, clearing house, stock exchange or investment fund manager. Rules like that
are non-existent in the EU directives.
In the case of the Act on Insurance Institutions, the full harmonization of the diver-
sification rules relating to the investment of technical reserves will be accomplished
during the amendment of the law.
5.3. Summary of the problems of domestic rules of consolidation
We have investigated the inadequacies of the present regulation in Hungary compared
to the EU rules in force. Issues which have also been problematic in the EU regulation
of conglomerates (heterogeneous financial groups) and led to the elaboration of the
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there (lags due to sectoral regulation, non-consistent overlapping and the lack of effi-
cient supervision of financial groups) are naturally problems in the Hungarian regula-
tion as well. Thus we might get a comprehensive overview of the tasks of Hungarian
regulators if we consider the recommendations of the Joint Forum (Basle) concerning
the regulation of conglomerates and those of the European Council – the more so
since, along with legal harmonization, the primary objective is to create efficient reg-
ulation of financial groups both for the supervision and for market players.
The limitations of the Hungarian regulation regarding consolidated supervision are:
A) Due to the incomplete regulations of the Act on Capital Markets (in fact, the
lack of full harmonization with the 93/6/EC directive)
– asymmetric requirements depending on the organizational structure
– lack of consolidated requirements in the case of groups which do not include
a credit institution
– lack of exemption from individual large exposure limits, if the investment firm
is subjected to consolidated report
B) Due to the incomplete regulations of the Act on Credit Institutions
– definition of group building criteria does not correspond to real interrelations and
EU provisions (e.g. the lack of discretionary power of the supervisory authority
in the case of dominant influence, in the case of participation the lack of defini-
tion and leaving out of participation relationship of over 20% of the voting right) 
– contradictory definitions (see financial holding)
– it is not clear as to which institutions certain provisions are related
– regarding the institutional scope of consolidated requirement, the Hungarian
rules sometimes surpass the effective regulation in the EU (including insur-
ance undertakings into the consolidated limits, capital requirements) or they
do not reach them at all (wrong definition or lack of the calculation of con-
solidated own funds)
– individual prudential requirements are not always coordinated with the con-
solidated requirement (i.e. regulatory capital).
C) Due to the lack of a Ministry of Finance decree on consolidated capital adequacy
– at the moment there is no regulation how different institutions could meet the
requirements of consolidated capital adequacy.
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Numerical examples to illustrate recommended methods of calcu-
lating capital adequacy
56
A1 Holding company (not regulated)
Assets Liabilities
Book value of participation in  Capital 300 
B1 bank 800 
B2 insurer 200 Liabilities 800
B3 leasing company 100
Total 1100 Total 1100 
B1 Bank (100% subsidiary of A1)
Assets Liabilities
Loans 900 Capital 800
Other assets 400 Liabilities 500
Total 1300 Total 1300
B2 Insurance company (100% subsidiary of A1)
Assets Liabilities
Investments 7000 Capital 200
General reserve 100
Technical provision 6700
Total 7000 Total 7000
B3 Leasing firm (100% subsidiary of A1, not regulated)
Assets Liabilities
Leases 2000 Capital 100
Liabilities 1900
Total 2000 Total 2000
Group (consolidated)
Assets Liabilities
Bank loans 900 Capital 300
Other bank assets 400 General reserve 100
Investments of insurance  7 000 Other liabilities 3 200
undertakings (bank)
Leases 2 000 Technical provision 6 700
Total 10 300 Total 10 300
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56 On the basis of Joint Forum (1999)Individual level capital requirement, capital adequacy
Capital requirement Regulatory capital Surplus/deficit
B1 Bank 100 800 700
B2 Insurance company 300 300 0
B3 Leasing firm (proxy, "notional") 150 100 –50
Group level capital requirement, capital adequacy
Capital requirement Regulatory capital Surplus/deficit
Building- block  100+300+150= 300+100 (consolidated)=
method 550 400 –150
Risk based  300(parent)+800(B1)+300
aggregation 550 (B2)+100(B3) –150
–1100(participations)=400
Risk based deduction: 
The new balance sheet of the parent after substituting the value of participations with the
amount of surplus or deficit:
Assets Liabilities
Participation in Capital –150 
B1 bank 700
B2 insurance company 0 Liabilities 800
B3 leasing firm –50
Total 650 Total 650




Parent company 100 75






















Parent + subsidiary 1
pro rata 
consolidation 





Parent + subsidiary 1
+ subsidiary 2  full
scale consolidation
180 135 35 10
Parent + subsidiary 1
+ subsidiary 2
pro-rata consolidation 
150 130 35 –15 
Numerical examples to illustrate differences between full-scale consolidation
and pro-rata consolidation
57
The first example illustrates the case when the pro-rata consolidation has a more
conservative, lower result. If the capital surplus of subsidiary No.1 is accounted
to the full extent on a group-wide level, this has a much more positive result than
the regulatory capital and capital requirement calculated according to the pro-
portion of participation. Full-scale consolidation might be based on the assump-
tion that the surplus capital of subsidiary No. 2 is to the full extent available for
the group members. In the example given, the capital taken into consideration
at the parent company instead of at minority owners is even able to compensate
the deficit of subsidiary 2 on the group-wide level.
57 On the basis of Joint Forum (1999). Examples were made on the basis of risk-based aggregation,
but any method would have the same result.108
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Example No. 2. In the case of the consolidation of subsidiary 1 – although each
of both group members has surplus capital – there is capital deficit on the group-
wide level. Individual capital surpluses develop due to multiple capital gearing.
The case of consolidating subsidiary 2 illustrates that if the subsidiary, which is
not owned 100% by the parent, has a capital deficit, then full-scale consolidation
has a lower result, since in this case the full deficit will be accounted at the major-
ity owner parent (the parent is the company which substitutes the deficit).
Parent company 100 90








subsidiary 1 (100%)  40 (anya 40) 25 –5
Parent + subsidiary 1 140 115 40 –5
Parent + subsidiary 1








Parent + subsidiary 1
+ subsidiary 2
pro-rata consolidation
150
(100+40+10)
127,5
(90+25+12,5)
50 (40+10) –27,5
subsidiary 2 (50%)
20 (parent
10, minori-
ty own. 10)
25 –5